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Abstract
In this thesis, we present a novel approach to database security which looks at queries
instead of the database tables themselves. In doing so, we use a number of Semantic
Web technologies to define rules, translate queries, and make assertions about com-
pliance with existing policies. We can ascertain compliance without looking at the
contents of the database. Our system can function as a drop-in addition to an existing
database system, adding additional functionality in a robust manner. The policies
are written in the AIR language, and the reasoners and wrapper scripts in C++ and
Python. We discuss the design and implementation of this system in detail.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Databases are a common way of storing data, and SQL is arguably the most popular
variety of database in production as of this writing. The most popular SQL databases
implementations, Oracle and MySQL, offer a rudimentary set of security options.
SQL has a table-centric view of data, and a UNIX-like security model. [5] A database
super-user can create individual tables, create user accounts, and grant or deny access
to certain tables to certain users.
The existing state of the art in database security is administrator-centric and
based on security models that are decades old. While adequate for many applications,
these systems have limitations. They provide an "all or nothing" model of security,
with no ability to show which rules provided an output or a specialized, data centric
policy system. More information about the conclusions that a policy system reached
is helpful. It promotes transparency, helps find errors, helps keep users honest, and
helps to promote more fine-grained access policies. I expand on these systems with
the use of Semantic Web technologies. In particular, I offer policy assurance, which
provides a guarantee that a database query was or was not in compliance with a
policy. Policy assurance provides an exact description of why a query is or is not
compliant.
To securely grant access to a piece of information, data security engineers typically
ask the following questions, or make assumptions as necessary:
9 Who are you?
* What information are you trying to see?
" Why do you want to see this information?
Electronic systems traditionally utilize a few common design patterns in their
implementations of security primitives. Discretionary access control [6] is the most
familiar approach, and the basis of the UNIX security model. A user or super-user
can expressly allow or deny other users certain permissions to certain pieces of data.
Mandatory access control [7] requires explicit permission for any action, granted by
an outside body; for a time, this was a popular design pattern for government systems
containing classified data. Role-based access control [8] groups users into specific roles,
which themselves have specific permissions. Rule based access control [9] allows an
administrator to create more specific policies for governing access.
This thesis documents a database security system built using Semantic Web tech-
nologies and design principles. I argue that a query to a database contains a substan-
tial amount of information about what a user is trying to access, and why they wish
to do so. I design and implement a system that implements rudimentary database
security, and provides explanations for the policies it enforces. Our model user is
"honest but curious": a trusted, well-intentioned employee of a government agency
who is using a database, provided under numerous policies and agreements, to the
user's agency.
The thesis introduces some key contributions to the field. The SPARQL to N3
conversion tool and related ontology are novel. The definitions of template policies,
and tools for creating them, reduce policy based security to a few primitives. Policy
assurance provides more transparency to users and administrators alike.
I approached this project in two phases. In phase one, I used SWObjects to
convert SPARQL queries to an RDF serialization. I wrote low level AIR policies to
check the compliance of these SPARQL queries, and demonstrated some test cases.
In phase two, I created an abstraction for these SPARQL queries, and provided a
meta level that removed dependence on the data structure.
1.1 Motivating Example
"Policy Assurance" is a set of technical mechanisms that enable effective
and accountable information sharing and usage. [10]
"Policy assurance" is a process by which we can be anywhere from reasonably to
absolutely certain that actions in a system are in compliance with an existing policy.
To validate the claim of compliance (or noncompliance), there is some data set which
validates the claim.
As a sample scenario, we consider a database that contains highly sensitive data
and, as a result, is only accessible to a limited number of people. For this possible
database, we assume that the database administrator is not the database owner,
and thus, cannot see either the contents of the database or the queries that external
parties make to the database. The database owner may only see the information in
the database, but not the queries made to it. Policy assurance allows the database
owner and database administrator to verify that every query made to the database
was in compliance with the given policies, without exposing any sensitive information.
The key point of policy assurance is that, if an external party knows the policies
and has access to enough information about each policy check, the external party can
verify the compliance of the policies. If there is a guarantee that every single access
is logged, then an external party can validate a claim of complete compliance. This
promotes transparency, by allowing verification, while providing security, which we
might define as "minimize the information required to permit verification."
1.1.1 Sample Usage Scenario
In this thesis, we will consider a simple usage scenario of an administrator who wishes
to guard data in an RDF data set which users access using SPARQL queries. In this
scenario, users may not access location information about entities in the datbase;
specifically, they may not retrieve or use address information in any form. The
administrator may not see the queries that users are making, for security reasons,
but must be certain that every single query made to the data set is compliant with
the policy about addresses.
The system described in this thesis is well suited to this task. In later sections,
we will describe how the administrator would create a policy to enforce this, and how
the administrator would check some sample queries manually. We will then describe
how this system could be configured to perform this task automatically, providing
policy assurance for the administrator and security for the users.
1.2 System Components
In this thesis, I present a system that provides policy assurance for SPARQL databases
by checking whether incoming queries conform to authorization policies written in
AIR. The system uses query based security to draw its conclusions. This system has
several components:
" A translator, which generates an N3 output from a SPARQL query. This output
serves as an input to a reasoner.
" An ontology which serves to define the N3 output of the translator.
" A number of pre-defined policy templates in AIR, which capture the behavior
of some of the most common policy design patterns. Some policies support
reasoning over a log of previous queries.
* An algorithm for automatically generating AIR policies by combining user in-
puts with policy templates.
* A Web interface for performing SPARQL to N3 translation.
* A Web interface for generating policies.
" A Web interface for checking queries against policies.
All of the Web interfaces in this thesis work with Tabulator's Justification UI, for
user-friendly viewing of queries and policies.
Figure 1-1: Architecture of our policy assurance reasoner, demonstrating separation
from the RDBMS.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The following chapter provides a
demonstration of the system, elaborates on the topic of policy assurance, and provides
an overview of how this system is useful in implementing policy assurance. Following
the overview, I discuss the design and implementation of each component of the
system in detail, with a discussion of the design assumptions and trade-offs necessary
for implementation. Then, I explore the performance of the reasoner. I then look at
future directions for this work, and draw comparisons with other work in the field,
before coming to a conclusion.
The appendix chapters provide background information. I discuss the ongoing
Semantic Web initiative and the technologies which provide the infrastructure for
this work. I offer code samples and useful information about the project code.
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Chapter 2
Policy Assurance
2.1 Introduction to Policy Assurance
In a broad sense, policies exist in almost any situation where multiple agents are in
contention for a shared resource. If these agents were in cooperation, or if there were
sufficient resources, there would be no contention, and thus, no need for a policy
system. The policies give a system a basis for mitigating contention.
Policies manifest themselves in multiple forms: as laws and customs in a human
world; as permissions and restrictions in a digital world; as habits in nature. Policy
seeks to identify particular actions, perhaps evaluated in a particular context, and
make a decision of some sort as a result of those actions. Policies exist for a number
of reasons. They may protect a shared resource from overuse or from simultaneous
users, which may damage the resource. They may regulate or restrict access to
certain kinds of resources, as access may cause side effects within a system. Policies
themselves often have justifications, to explain their existence.
In the everyday world, rules may exist for our own protection, or the protection
of others. As an example, I consider the public road system. There are a large
number of policies which concern the use of public roads, for any purpose, by any
individual. The existence of the policies is something of a fair trade bargain: without
the policies, the road system would deteriorate to the point of being useless; without
a road system, many other activities (such as trade, visiting others, providing medical
care, obtaining food, etc.) would become exceedingly difficult. The policies may not
be ideal, but are a superior option to the complete absence of the system.
A well-known policy states that "all users of motorized vehicles on public roads
must be certified." In common terms, I know this as all drivers must have a license.
This is a simple, if expensive, policy to enforce: an agent (usually a police officer) may
check for compliance of this policy by asking someone operating a motorized vehicle
to present their license for inspection. This policy is expensive to enforce because
the means for doing so involve either having a police officer check everyone's license
(which is not feasible), or requiring a license in order to enable a vehicle's operation
(which may also be infeasible). As a result, there is some non-zero probability that
there are unlicensed drivers on the road.
In this case, complete policy assurance is exceedingly difficult. Every time an
officer checks a driver's license, there is a record which includes the date and time
of the check, the officer's identity, the identity of the driver and the vehicle, and
information about the driver's license. This provides policy assurance for a single
incident, but complete assurance is not feasible. In practice, the choice to check
every single action versus some probabilistic number of interactions is itself a policy
decision, hopefully the result of a rigorous risk or cost-benefit analysis.
In a digital world, the marginal cost of explicit checks and storing lots of data
are far lower, and in many situations, effectively negligible or even zero. Thus, it is
easily possible to perform a rigorous check of every action against policies. As an
example, consider a Web site with a policy that states, "all users of the advanced
features of this Web site must have a valid account." Regardless of the definitions of
user, feature, valid, and account that a Web site may choose, it is straightforward to
perform a check every time a user tries to access an advanced feature. The Web site
may maintain a log of successful and unsuccessful attempts to use advanced features.
We believe that the AIR language, reasoner, and Semantic Web approach is a good
fit for the problem of securing a database with sensitive data [1]. The policies we write
only need to look at the queries that a user makes. In the case of most policies, we
only need to look at a single query to determine compliance. The reasoner looks at
compliance +
Justification
party pohicies
plain-text
queries
Figure 2-1: Overview of an integrated policy assurance system. From [1].
a user's query, and an administrator's policy, compares the two, and finds code in
the query that matches some template in the policy. The reasoner output provides
positive, verified confirmation that a query is or is not in compliance with a policy,
while only divulging enough information from the query to back up the compliance
claim. The policy assurance approach fulfills the need for positive confirmation and
traceability of query compliance using the minimal amount of data. Indeed, if the
very contents or results of the query are confidential, we must tread carefully.
2.2 User Roles and Perspectives
The system we present herein has multiple usage scenarios, to help end users imple-
ment this system and integrate it into existing databases.
2.2.1 The Administrator
A database administrator, or DBA, would be the first user to interact with the system.
The DBA is the entity responsible for maintaining a data set, and thus, for creating
policies that regulate access to the data set. It is possible that the DBA does not
have access to the queries that a user will make, and it is also possible that the DBA
only has access to a data set's metadata.
In order to create a policy, a DBA must have a list of the fields in a database, and
..................
................ -
in particular, the data types of those fields as URIs. Our implementation of policies
at present is largely dependent on finding a query that binds to a particular data
type. I are working on a tool that helps to automate this process by determining
what types are used in a data set, though this is moot if the DBA cannot access the
data set proper.
It is up to the DBA to determine what kinds of policies they wish to implement.
The DBA may be bound by local and national laws, by department practices, or by
any number of other factors in creating policies. In all likelihood, the policies that
the DBA needs to implement will be expressible in terms of the primitives that I
define in the next chapter. The DBA would then use the Web based tool to create
policies using our templates, and possibly check for compliance using some sample
queries the same way a user would. Some policies can be "history aware", meaning
that the policy looks at all of a user's past queries in addition to the current query
when making a compliance decision.
2.2.2 The User
The second major user of this system is someone who wishes to access the database.
There are two possible modes of operation here. If the DBA or a system administrator
has configured the policy assurance system as a SPARQL add-in, it is possible that the
user will see no change, other than having some queries rejected for lack of compliance.
Holver, if the DBA chooses to implement the Web-based option, the user would be
able to see the compliance output of their query in a Tabulator-equipped Web browser.
The reasoner's output would be helpful in aiding the "honest but curious" user to
make compliant queries to the database.
2.2.3 The Auditor
The third user of the policy assurance system is the auditor. This is a person or entity
charged with the responsibility of assuring that the policies that the DBA wrote are
correct, and that the system achieves compliance. The auditor would be able to access
the query history, the policies, and the reasoner outputs, and manually verify that
things are working correctly. An important future work of this project is to provide
tools that help the auditor perform query analysis.
2.3 Modes of Operation
As implemented in this thesis, the policy assurance system exists entirely outside
of any database implementation. It would allow analysis of a query history by a
user or administrator, and allow a user or administrator to check new queries for
compliance before sending them to the database. With no further modification, this
system could work, slowly but effectively, in a hypothetical "air gap" environment
where a user sends a query to an administrator for manual verification and entry. An
important future work is to integrate this completely with a SPARQL endpoint; we
describe the work needed here in the Future Work section.
2.4 Demonstration
In this section, we demonstrate the workflow for an administrator who wishes to
create a policy and use it to check queries for compliance using the Firefox Web
browser with the Tabulator browser plugin. This section expands on the sample use
scenario presented in the introduction. The workflow for all policy types is similar.
2.4.1 Describing a Free-Text Policy
The administrator wants to encode a policy that says, "users may not find out where
members of the database live. In the case of my data set, this means that users may
not see any data of the type ex: address. Users may not USE or RETRIEVE such
data."
The first thing that the administrator needs to do is to create a policy. The
administrator heads to the policy generation page,
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/policy-assurance/generator/
The administrator clicks the "Restriction Policy" link, since this policy is most in
line with what the administrator wants to do. The administrator enters the following
input:
" Policy name: no-address
* Policy description: Users may not find the home address of members of the
database.
" Namespaces: Opref ix ex: <http://example.com/#>.
" Included attributes: Variable: ex: address. Click "both" to check USE and
RETRIEVE.
The administrator clicks "Submit!" to generate the policy (see figure 2-2), and it
appears in Tabulator as shown in figure 2-3.
The administrator can type Ctrl+U to see the source AIR code of the policy. The
source of this policy is in the appendix B.12.
The policy has a unique URI. Since the administrator will need the URI later, the
administrator saves the URI, as in figure 2-4.
2.4.2 Checking a Compliant Query
An administrator wants to check the following SPARQL query for compliance. Since
it does not mention ex: address, the administrator suspects that it will be compliant:
PREFIX example: <http: //example. com/#>
SELECT * WHERE {
?s example:ssn ?ssn.
?s example:age ?age.
?s example:name ?name.
FILTER (?age > 18)
}
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Figure 2-3: Tabulator Representation of the Sample "No Address" Restriction Policy
http: //dig. csail.mit . edu/2009/policy-assurance/generator/make_
restriction-policy .py?policyName=no-address&textDescription=Users+may
+not+find+the+home+address+of+members+of+the+database .&namespaces=%40
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Figure 2-4: URI for the demo "no address" policy.
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Figure 2-5: Converting a SPARQL Query to N3
The administrator visits the translation page to perform the translation:
http: //dig. csail .mit .edu/2009/policy-assurance/sparql2n3. py
The administrator enters the query into the translator and gets the result shown
in figure 2-6. The translated query appears in a Web browser in figure 2-5.
The administrator clicks the "View in Tabulator" link, to see what the translation
looks like in Tabulator. The result is in figure 2-7.
The translation has a unique URI, which is the URI of the Tabulator page. The
administrator saves the URI, as in figure 2-8, for checking the query for compliance.
....... ..  ...... .
... ................................................................
@prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query19369095151250692756 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s: triplePattern
s: triplePattern
s:triplePattern
s:triplePattern
{ :s <http://example.com/#ssn>
{ :s <http://example.com/#age>
: ssn
: age };
:s <http://example.com/#name> :name };
:age s:booleanGT "18 "};
s:retrieve [
s:var :age;
s:var :name;
s:var :s;
s:var :ssn;
Figure 2-6: Compliant SPARQL query, converted to N3.
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%2FsparqlX23X3E+. %OAXOA3AQuery19369095151250692756+a+s%3ASPARQLQuery
%3BX0AOAs%3Aclause+[%OA++s%3AtriplePattern++{+%3As+%3Chttp%3A%2F
%2Fexample. com%2FX23ssn%3E+%3Assn+}%3BOA++s%3AtriplePattern++{+
%3As+%3Chttp%3A%2F%2Fexample .com%2F%23age%3E+%3Aage+}%3BOA++s%3A
triplePattern++{+%3As+%3Chttp3AX2FX2Fexample. com%2F%23name%3E+%3A
name+}%3BX0 A++s%3AtriplePattern++{+%3Aage+sX3AbooleanGT+%2218+%22}%3B
%OAOAI%3B+%OA++ +s%3Aretrieve+[%OA++++++sX3Avar+%3Aage%3BX0A+++
+++s%3Avar+%3Aname%3BOA++++++s%3Avar+%3As%3BOA++++++s%3Avar+%3A
ssn%3BOA] . XOAXOA
Figure 2-8: URI for the translation of the compliant demo query.
To check the query for compliance against the policy, the administrator goes to
the policy execution page:
http: //dig. csail . mit . edu/2009/policy-assurance/run-policy . py
The administrator pastes in the URIs of the query and the policy into the correct
text boxes, and clicks "Execute". A "View in Tabulator" link appears, as in figure 2-
9, which the administrator clicks. The Tabulator page appears, and the administrator
views the output, as in figure 2-10. The administrator can use the justification pane
to get more information about this decision, as in figure 2-11.
2.4.3 Checking an Incompliant Query
The administrator now checks an incompliant query:
PREFIX ex: <http://example.com/#>
SELECT * WHERE {
?s ex:address ?a.
}
This translation has the URI listed in figure 2-14.
Following the same steps as before, the administrator can see that this query is
non compliant, as in figure 2-12 and 2-13.
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Figure 2-14: URI for the translation of the non-compliant demo query.
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2.4.4 Demo Notes
This demonstration will work on any Firefox Web browser with a recent version of
the Tabulator plugin installed. Without the Tabulator plugin, the demo will work
in any Web browser. However, withou the plugin, a browser will either display the
textual output of the reasoner, or prompt the user to save the output to a file on disk.
2.5 Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the system implemented in this thesis. It de-
scribed a sample scenario, and defined three perspectives to the system. It provided a
Web based demonstration of the three major components of the system: the SPARQL
to N3 query converter, the automated policy generator, and the user-friendly reasoner
output. The following chapters offer more technical information about the design and
implementation of this system.
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Chapter 3
System Detail
In this chapter, we discuss the implementation details of the policy assurance system.
Each section details a particular component of the system, discussing the design
assumptions, choices, and tradeoffs that were necessary. This chapter serves as full
and complete documentation of this project for future users and developers of the
system.
This section benefits from a working knowledge of RDF, N3, AIR, SPARQL,
Python, and C++. The code to support this discussion is included in the appendix.
3.1 SPARQL Query Translation
The policies that we defined in AIR in the previous section require SPARQL queries to
be in a particular N3 syntax in order to correctly perform reasoning. The design of the
AIR policy and the SPARQL query translation go hand in hand. The first approach
at query reasoning used a SPARQL translation that maintained the semantics of the
SPARQL query, in fulfillment of the Phase we milestone for this project. In time, we
moved to a translation that removes many of the semantics of SPARQL queries. We
discuss the details of the new translation herein.
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:Query60879785125066900 a S:SPARQLQuery;
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s:triplefattern ( :s <http://dig.cail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/generlc~c> :c }:
stretrieve [
s:var :b;
9:var :c;
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Figure 3-1: A screenshot of the SPARQL to N3 translator Web page.
................ ......................... ....................... ......... ... ........................
* : SPARQLQuery. Refers to a query converted to N3.
-: source. A data source for the query. In SPARQL, this can be FROM or
FROM NAMED. A :SPARQLQuery may have many of these.
- :retrieve. A list of variables to which the :SPARQLQuery refers. A
:SPARQLQuery has exactly one of these.
* :var. A member of the :retrieve which describes a particular vari-
able.
- clause. The contents of the :SPARQLQuery. This corresponds to the
WHERE clause in SPARQL. A :SPARQLQuery has exactly one of these.
* :triplePattern. A particular line or binding in a :SPARQLQuery.
Table 3.1: Query conversion ontology.
3.1.1 SPARQL to N3 Web Page
The SPARQL to N3 Web page serves as a front-end to the conversion process discussed
in the previous section. The user inputs a well-formed SPARQL query into the form
on the page. Upon clicking submit, the page's backend script will pass the query
to the translator, a command-line based utility. The translator then returns an N3
translation of the user's SPARQL query to the Web page.
A user may use the SPARQL to N3 translator directly to help debug the policy
process, or to gain understanding of the query process. It is important to note that
the N3 translation does not preserve all SPARQL semantics, nor does it preserve
order in some cases. In the majority of use cases, the user will interact indirectly
with the translator.
3.1.2 Query Conversion Ontology
We define an ontology for N3 conversion of generic queries in table 3.1. All of these
names are defined in the query conversion namespace, which is:
http: //dig. csail.mit . edu/2009/policy-assurance/sparql.n3#
The ontology is intentionally small, short, and simple. Whereas the first iteration
of query translation focused to have a bidirectional, complete N3 translation of a
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Figure 3-2: Ontology diagram of the SPARQL translation, courtesy of Yotam Aron.
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SPARQL query, the goal of this ontology is to facilitate the conversion of queries in
additional languages, and to contain the minimum amount of information necessary so
as to continue to be useful in making assertions according to our current policies. (An
important future work of this project, and perhaps the largest hurdle to widespread
adoption, is the support of SQL queries.)
The next subsections will demonstrate exactly how we convert a query.
3.1.3 swobjects: Parsing and Serializing
The current implementation of the SPARQL to N3 translator is an adaptation of Eric
Prud'Hommeaux's swobjects code [11]. swobjects, per its homepage, is a suite of tools
written in C++ for performing operations upon Semantic Web objects. swobjects is
an important part of the SPASQL project, a project whose goal is to facilitate data
integration from multiple databases [12].
This project modifies the serialization engine of swobjects. The swobjects code,
in one mode of operation, will accept a SPARQL query as input, and print the same
SPARQL query as output. The swobjects code performs parsing and lexing of the
input, and creates a parse tree that it expresses. By overloading the classes of the
SPARQLSerializer code in swobjects, we were able to modify the output of a SPARQL
query. By carefully defining the output and performing a small amount of additional
processing, we are able to perform conversion.
The C++ code that overloads the SPARQLSerializer is located in the DIG repos-
itory at
http: //dig. csail .mit . edu/2009/policy-assurance/sparql2n3. cpp
3.1.4 SPARQL Language Translation
In this section, we discuss the details of translating a SPARQL query to N3. The
discussion closely follows the W3C Recommendation for SPARQL [4], and uses some
queries from the DAWG test case [13]. We discuss which features we support, and
how we support them. We explain which features of the language we do not support,
and why we chose the approach that we did in a few situations. The translation is
incomplete; in particular, the GRAPH feature does not work, nested queries do not
work, and the FILTER keyword is only partially supported. Furthermore, whites-
pace generation needs improvement. Nevertheless, this translation is suitable for the
majority of simple SPARQL queries.
As of this writing, the query translator is live. To use it, please visit:
http: //dig. csail . mit . edu/2009/policy-assurance/sparql2n3 . py
Namespaces and URIs: BASE and PREFIX
A SPARQL query may specify its own namespace using the @prefix keyword, or the
Abase keyword:
@prefix dc: <http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/>
A namespace is shorthand, allowing truncation of URIs. For lack of ambiguity,
we kept the swobjects feature of expanding or flattening all URIs. The output of the
translation only specifies one name space: the namespace of the translation ontology.
Query Identification
Every query that goes through the translator is assigned a unique name. In the
current implementation, we cannot be assured of the uniqueness of the name, but
as it is assigned by a random number plus the current time stamp (seconds since
UNIX epoch), the probability of 1 in 232 of a collision in one second is acceptably
low. A one-way hash of a query does not work, as this causes successive translations
of the same query to have the same name. It is conceivable that a user might run
the same query, or a series of very similar queries, an arbitrary number of times. Our
policies depend on uniquely named policies to correctly determine which policies are
in compliance or violation of a policy.
SELECT
A SPARQL query with a SELECT clause "returns all, or a subset of, the variables
bound in a query pattern match." Thus, a query with a SELECT clause has a variable
part and a triple pattern part.
If we input the query:
# Sample SPARQL query that queries for SSN, age, OpenID.
PREFIX example: <http: //example. com/#>
PREFIX f oaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>
SELECT ?s ?n WHERE {
?s example:ssn ?n. ?s foaf:age ?a. ?s foaf:openid ?id.}
The translator will generate the N3 output:
@pref ix s: <http://dig.csail.mit .edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query9743408551250696473 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern { :s <http://example.com/#ssn> :n 1;
s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/age> :a };
s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/openid> :id };
1;
s:retrieve [
s:var :n;
s:var :s;
].
SELECT *
The syntax SELECT * is an abbreviation that selects all of the variables in a query [4].
To implement this, the translator adopts a special behavior when it sees SELECT
*. It will maintain a set of all variables mentioned in the body of the query. At the
end of the clause, after processing is complete, the translator will print a list of every
variable seen. In effect, this implements the correct handling of SELECT *, in line
with the "flattening" philosophy of the translator.
Given this example query, with a SELECT *,
# Sample SPARQL query that queries for SSN, age, OpenID.
PREFIX example: <http: //example. com/#>
PREFIX foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>
SELECT * WHERE {
?s example:ssn ?n. ?s foaf:age ?a. ?s foaf:openid ?id.}
The translator will generate the N3 output:
@prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query14924979641250696494 a s : SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern { :s <http://example.com/#ssn> :n 1;
s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/age> :a };
s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/openid> :id };
];
s:retrieve [
s:var :a;
s:var :id;
s:var :n;
s:var :s;
].
CONSTRUCT
A CONSTRUCT query is very similar to a SELECT, except in that it creates a new
RDF graph with its output. In effect, it is a union of all of the solution sets. Thus,
the useful output of a CONSTRUCT query is the same as a similar SELECT query,
in that it will only output explicit and not blank variables. The translator handles
variables in a CONSTRUCT similarly to a SELECT *: it will output every non-blank
variable mentioned in the CONSTRUCT part of the clause.
Given this example query, with a CONSTRUCT,
CONSTRUCT { ?s <p1> <0> . ?s <p2> ?o } WHERE {?s ?p ?o}
The translator will generate the N3 output:
prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query13731259441250696648 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern { :s :p :o };
];
s:retrieve [
s:var :o;
s:var :s;
].
Note that the variable list is always placed after the clause, due to the current
implementation of the translator. The reasoner will accept the variable list before or
after the clause without loss of functionality.
ASK
In an ASK query, the user may "test whether or not a query pattern has a solution.
No information is returned about the possible query solutions, just whether or not
a solution exists." [4] Thus, no variables are bound or output in an ASK clause. Of
course, an ASK query may still explicitly refer to a particular field or data type which
we may wish to regulate, so it is important to capture that pattern in the output.
Given this example query, with an ASK,
PREFIX foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>
ASK { ?x foaf:name "Alice" }
The translator will generate the N3 output:
@pref ix s: <http://dig.csail.mit. edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query5293946291250696665 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern { :x <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name> "Alice" };
].
This is sensible, because even though we don't directly output any data from the
database, we are asking about "Alice" and learning something about a foaf:name.
DESCRIBE
The SPARQL DESCRIBE construct is implementation dependent. A particular
SPARQL endpoint may implement DESCRIBE as it sees fit. From a translation
and policy standpoint, it is possible that DESCRIBE query will return information
about the variables and triple patterns it describes. Thus, we treat DESCRIBE as
we would a SELECT.
Given this example query, with a DESCRIBE,
DESCRIBE <u> ?u WHERE { <x> <q> ?u . }
The translator will generate the N3 output:
@pref ix s: <http://dig.csail.mit .edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query2577564471250696683 a s:SPARQLQuery;
<u>s:clause [
s:triplePattern { <x> <q> :u };
];
s:retrieve [
s:var :u;
].
Query Modifiers: ORDER BY, LIMIT, OFFSET, DISTINCT, REDUCED
SPARQL supports a number of query modifiers that alter the output. ORDER BY
serves to sort the output by its argument. LIMIT reduces the number of patterns
that a query may bind. OFFSET works with ORDER BY and LIMIT to select a
subset of the full output. DISTINCT and REDUCED change how a SPARQL query
will handle duplicates.
These query modifiers form important parts of SPARQL's semantics. However,
from a policy standpoint, their results are highly data dependent. Since the trans-
lation must be as pessimistic as possible, it simply drops these keywords from the
output.
OPTIONAL
The OPTIONAL keyword serves to make a query pattern conditional. Normally,
individual query triple patterns are mandatory, and all of them must be satisfied if
they chain together. An OPTIONAL pattern is not mandatory. It will return results
if they are present in the store, but will not fail if there is no data to support it.
Since our translator must take a pessimistic stance, we simply drop the OP-
TIONAL keyword from the translation. Our policies must be able to detect if there
is any possibility that a triple pattern will result in a binding. It is unimportant
whether or not the pattern is mandatory if we assume that it will have a binding.
UNION
The UNION keyword allows the user to specify alternatives to a query pattern bind-
ing. This allows multiple results to be concatenated. The translator simply drops the
UNION keyword, since policies do not need to use its semantics.
Given this example query, with a UNION,
PREFIX dc10: <http://example/1.0/>
PREFIX dc1l: <http://example/1.1/>
SELECT ?title
WHERE { { ?book dc10:title ?title }
UNION
{ ?book dcll:title ?title } }
Table 3.2: Conversion of Boolean operators. The
operator in the translator code. The "translation"
the query translation namespace.
''name"' refers to the title of the
is what the translator outputs, in
The translator will generate the N3 output:
@prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query15319361881250696825 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern
s:triplePattern
s:retrieve [
s:var :title;
].
Boolean Functions
{ :book <http://example/1.0/title>
{ :book <http://example/1.1/title>
SPARQL FILTERs support a number of boolean operators. The translation changes
those operators into terms defined in its namespace. This allows the writing of policies
that can detect these operators. A future work is to declare these as equal to other
operators in other ontologies. The current translation is in table 3.2.
Operator Name Translation
- arithmeticNegation :arithmeticNegation
/ arithmeticInverse arithmeticlnverse
+ arithmeticSum :arithmeticSum
* aritlmetiProduct arithmeticProduct
& booleanConjunction :booleanAND
I booleanDisjunction :booleanOR
! booleanNegation :booleanNOT
= booleanEQ :booleanEQ
booleanNE :booleanNE
< booleanLT :booleanLT
> booleanGT :booleanGT
<= booleanLE :booleanLE
booleanGE :booleanGE
:title };
:title };
Built-in Functions: STR, LANG, LANGMATCHES, DATATYPE, BOUND,
sameTERM, isURI, isIRI, isLITERAL, REGEX, true, false
SPARQL supports a number of built in functions for query processing. Their primary
use is to serve as arguments to the FILTER keyword. Our translation does not support
these built in functions at present.
FILTER
The FILTER keyword in SPARQL allows the user to restrict a query's output based
on a condition. The condition may be a triple pattern, which we fully support and
exemplify below. Alternately, the condition may include a built-in function, which
we do not support; the most popular form if this is FILTER REGEX. In terms of
writing policies, a FILTER counts as a "use" of a policy. In the case of a triple
pattern, our translator drops the FILTER keyword, as its semantics are unimportant
to the translator, and includes the triple pattern from the FILTER.
Given this example query, with a FILTER,
SELECT * WHERE { FILTER (?o>5) . ?s ?p ?o }
The translator will generate the N3 output:
Oprefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query10909264011250696848 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern { :s :p :o };
s:triplePattern { :o s:booleanGT "5 "};
1;
s:retrieve [
s:var :o;
s:var :p;
s:var :s;
].
GRAPH
The GRAPH keyword restricts a particular pattern to only apply to unnamed (using
the FROM keyword) or named (using the FROM NAMED keyword) graphs. If used
in conjunction with a named graph, the result will note which graph contained the
matching result. At present, the translation does not support the GRAPH keyword.
It requires some further consideration, as it is difficult to express and complicates a
query.
One possibility is to simply drop it; this would easily support all of the semantics
of an unnamed graph query, and allow us to write policies that simply check which
graphs we include with FROM or FROM NAMED. Another, more sophisticated,
approach would be to generate several equivalent queries, in effect flattening the
GRAPH keyword. With multiple uses of GRAPH in a query, this could easily grow
exponentially.
3.1.5 Lost in Translation
As mentioned earlier, our original translation maintained more SPARQL semantics.
This approach is deprecated in favor of the approach described here, but for com-
pleteness, we include a SPARQL query with translations under the old and new
translations.
Given this SPARQL query as input,
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
PREFIX type: <http://dig.csail.mit. edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/generic#>
SELECT ?s ?b ?c WHERE {
?s type:b ?b.
?s type:c ?c.
}
the first version of the translation would have yielded this output,
Opref ix type: <http://dig.csail.mit. edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/generic#>
@prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .
Opref ix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
@prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
Oprefix : <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/queryl#>
:Query-1 a s:Select;
s:cardinality :ALL;
s:POSList [
s:variable :S;
s:variable :B;
s:variable :C;
1;
s:WhereClause :WHERE.
:WHERE a s:DefaultGraphPattern;
s:TriplePattern
s:TriplePattern
{ :S type:B
{ :S type:C
whereas the current version of the translator yields this output.
Oprefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#> .
:Query6088797851250696900 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern
s : triplePattern
{ :s <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/
IARPA-PIR/generic#b> :b };
{ : s <http: //dig. csail . mit . edu/2009/
IARPA-PIR/generic#c> :c };
s:retrieve [
s:var :b;
s:var :c;
s:var :s;
The first version closely preserved most, if not all, of the SPARQL semantics. We
found this approach to be cumbersome, as it required writing brittle policies that
closely followed SPARQL query semantics. The old approach did not scale well, and
did not lend itself to automated policy generation.
#ends
:B };
:C }.
3.1.6 Translator Summary
The translator presented herein is novel, in that we know of no prior attempt to
express a SPARQL query in N3 for any reason. The implementation of the translator
offers insight as to exactly what parts of an arbitrary query give it structure and
permit reasoning. We found that most of the SPARQL semantics simply led to more
complicated policies, and were redundant.
3.2 AIR Policy Generation
3.2.1 Templates for Policy Generation
The goal of this project is to make policy assurance accessible to a user with an inter-
mediate level of technical understanding, without a thorough grounding in Semantic
Web technologies. To this end, this project offers a number of templates that allow
a user to directly create policies according to several fixed design patterns. With a
list of attributes as an input, the policy generator will create a valid AIR policy to
facilitate reasoning.
All of these templates work on the level of single attributes. Furthermore, the
policies that the templates generate rely on matching very particular triple patterns.
Though users can represent many policies with a combination of one or more tem-
plates, there are policies that the templates cannot describe. These patterns cover
some basic cases, and provide a starting point for more advanced policies. A descrip-
tion of some of the common design patterns follows. An advanced, AIR-savvy user is
still able to create their own policies.
3.2.2 Supported Policy Types
At this time, this project defines five separate kinds of policies. These policies are
designed to be templates, to help an administrator create or implement more sophis-
ticated policies. These policies do not necessarily exhaust the space of policies that
this system can represent, but serve as a basis for many policies. Each policy works
by matching a particular variable type or attribute, and taking action when it finds
that type. The five policies, in no particular order, perform as described on variable
types that a user enters.
" Restriction. Blocks access to a variable type.
* Inclusion. Lumps variable types together, so a user must access either all of
them or none of them.
" Exclusion. Allows a user access to all but one of the specified variable types.
" Chaining. Accepts a list of variable types. If the user mentions the first
variable type, chaining takes action if it sees any of the following variable types.
" Default Deny. Restricts access to the specified variable types.
The following sections describe the implementation details of each of these policies.
To USE and to RETRIEVE
All of the policy templates in this section implement patterns which detect two com-
mon usage patterns, USE and RETRIEVE. To USE an attribute is to pull it from a
database and make decisions based on its value. To RETRIEVE an attribute is to pull
it from a database and display it directly to the user. It is possible to USE an attribute
without a RETRIEVE, and vice versa.
When a user submits a query to USE a variable, the policy detects this by searching
for a particular triple pattern:
:W s:triplePattern :T;
:T log:includes { [] example:age :V };
:W s:triplePattern :U;
:U log:includes { :V [1 [1 }.
The policy is looking for a pair of triple patterns to detect usage. In the first triple
pattern, a variable is the object of a triple pattern, with an attribute as the predicate.
In the second triple pattern, the variable that was the object of the first pattern is
now the subject. This ascertains that a user bound a variable to a certain attribute,
and is trying to use that same variable for further processing. As an example, the
following query would match this pattern.
# Sample SPARQL query that queries for SSN, age, OpenID.
PREFIX example: <http: //example. com/#>
PREFIX foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>
SELECT * WHERE {
?s example:ssn ?n. ?s foaf:age ?a. ?s foaf:openid ?id.
FILTER (?a > 18) }
This query, translated into N3 with the aforementioned converter, appears as
follows.
@prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
:Query-1644923176 a s:SPARQLQuery;
s:retrieve [
1;
s:clause [
s:triplePattern { :s <http://example.com/#ssn> :n };
s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/age> :a };
s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/openid> :id };
s:triplePattern { :a s:booleanGT "18 "};
s:retrieve [
s:var :a;
s:var :id;
s:var :n;
s:var :s;
].
In particular, the USE policy would find two triple patterns of interest, indicating
that the user's query is trying to USE something with an attribute of f oaf : age:
s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/age> :a };
s:triplePattern { :a s:booleanGT "18 "};
A user may RETRIEVE an attribute independently of trying to USE it. When trying
to RETRIEVE, a user will submit a query that binds an output variable to a particular
attribute. In other words, the user submits a SPARQL query for verification, with
a {subject, predicate, object} triple in which the predicate is a type (specifically, a
URI, like example: dob), and the object is a variable, like :V. The reasoner uses this
information to decide, ":V is a variable that will match things of type example: dob."
The policy looks at variables in the context of attributes in the database, instead
of the actual, bound values within the database itself, since our policies never look
inside the database.
The following code demonstrates an AIR pattern that will catch a user trying to
RETRIEVE an attribute with a type example: dob.
:P s:var :V;
:W s:triplePattern :T;
:T log:includes { [1 example:dob :V }
To RETRIEVE an attribute, a user must explicitly SELECT a variable (or SELECT *),
and bind it in a triple pattern as the object, with the attribute as the subject. In the
aforementioned query, a user's attempt to RETRIEVE an attribute of type example: ssn
is evident with these N3 statements.
s:retrieve [
s:var :n; ]
s:clause [
s:triplePattern { :s <http://example.com/#ssn> :n }; ]
The important distinction between RETRIEVE and USE is that the former allows
a user to access data in a data set directly, while the latter does not. Once a user
has seen a particular piece of data, the policy assurance framework considers it to be
"public". There may be incentives in place for the user to control data retrieved from
a data set, but those incentives are external to the policies.
The distinction between USE and RETRIEVE is intended for honest, but curious,
users, to help keep them honest. An attacker could easily write a series of USE
policies that return data that is equivalent to a RETRIEVE. For example, the author's
calculations based on publicly available Social Security Administration data shows
that there are 746,347,500 possible Social Security numbers. If a policy prevents a
user from directly seeing a Social Security number in a database, the user could simply
exhaust the SSN space using USE queries. An administrator can specify policies that
limit the number of times a user can access a particular attribute. A true security
approach with a malicious user in mind is an important future work, well outside the
scope of this thesis.
With these common access patterns defined, it is possible to write template policies
that can flag these accesses.
The discussion of sample policy templates uses possible fields from a database
of personal information. Specifically, it uses examplename for a person's name,
example: age for a person's date of birth, example: dob for a person's date of birth,
and example: ssn for a person's social security number. In practice, a system of real-
world policies would require multiple AIR policies; an important future work would
help a user with this task.
The template policies are restriction, inclusion, exclusion, history-aware exclusion,
chaining, and default deny. A description of each template policy follows. Samples
of all of these policies are available in the appendix. Furthermore, tables which
demonstrate how these ideas become policies appear at 3.3 and 3.4. 1
Restriction
A restriction policy disallows a user from performing a USE or RETRIEVE opera-
tion (or both) concerning any data with a particular attribute. The policy implicitly
implies that a user can see all of the data in a data set, with the exception of the
restrictions put in place by a restriction policy. Restriction is most helpful for con-
trolling the way a user interacts with data of a particular attribute.
The sample restriction policy in appendix section B.6 states that a user:
" May not RETRIEVE any attribute of type example:name.
" May not USE any attribute of type example: age.
" May not RETRIEVE any attribute of type example: dob.
" May not USE any attribute of type example: ssn.
A user may, for example, USE an attribute of type example:name, since it is a
pattern that the policy does not mention.
The policy runner will assert that the user is not in compliance with this policy
if it finds any one of those usage patterns in a query. It will return the decision, with
an explanation. The policy runner does not evaluate patterns in any particular order.
In practice, a restriction policy would be most useful with a default deny policy in
place.
Inclusion
An inclusion policy requires that a user tie together certain actions. Inclusion imple-
ments an all or none policy that is only available using two or more attributes. An
administrator might use this policy to ensure that two fields in a data set are always
coupled.
The sample restriction policy in appendix section B.7 states that a user's query
is compliant if the query will:
* RETRIEVE any attribute of type example: name, AND
e USE any attribute of type example: age, AND
" RETRIEVE any attribute of type example: dob, AND
" USE any attribute of type example: ssn.
If a query contains any subset of these patterns, but not all of them, the query is
incompliant. If the query does not contain any of these patterns, it is compliant.
In practice, an inclusion policy likely has little use. A policy that requires a
mandatory filter, such as an age filter, will use chaining and not inclusion.
Exclusion
An exclusion policy is, in effect, the inverse of an inclusion policy. It allows an
administrator to tie together a number of patterns. Under an exclusion policy, a
user's query (or query history) may contain "all but one" of the patterns in the
policy.
The sample exclusion policy in appendix section B.8 states that a user's query is
not compliant if the query will:
1. RETRIEVE any attribute of type example:name, AND
2. USE any attribute of type example: age, AND
3. RETRIEVE any attribute of type example: dob, AND
4. USE any attribute of type example: ssn.
A user's query may access all but one of these patterns with an AND relation,
or none of them at all. As an example, the user can RETRIEVE example:name
and RETRIEVE example: dob and USE example: ssn, either in one query or in
successive queries if history is enabled. If the user does this, they will not be able to
USE example : age. Exhaustively, if we use the notation {a A b A ... } to express a user
trying to access attributes from the above list, the user may NOT do {1 A 2 A 3 A 4},
but may do any subset of that, including {} (nothing).
Exclusion is the only basic policy construct for which it makes sense to use a
history. The sample policy in appendix section B.9 demonstrates how a policy needs
to change in order to support query history. In a break from all other policies, a
history-aware policy needs to have an idea of which is the current query, and which
are the past queries. This is important, since AIR, a production rule system, does
not support any concept or order or counting. A history-aware policy will assert
non-compliance if it matches all of the patterns in the policy, regardless of whether
those patterns are contained solely in the history, solely in the current query, or in
some combination of current and past queries. A full explanation of query history
follows in the next section.
Originally, this project sought to include a MAX(m, n) construct. Exclusion
implements a MAX (n - 1, n) policy, where a user can see at most n - 1 out of n
patterns. Implementing the more general MAX(m, n) for m < n and n > 0 involves
combinatorics and does not scale well. Finding an efficient, scalable implementaiton
of general MAX(m, n) is an important future work.
Chaining
The chaining policy allows an administrator to implement policies in the form IF
... THEN ... ; to detect the presence of a pattern and determine compliance or non
compliance based on the presence of future patterns. A chaining policy can either be
default compliant (in which case a pattern match asserts non-compliance), or default
non-compliant. The code for the chaining policy generator supports RETRIEVE and
USE, as well as filter patterns.
The sample chaining policy in appendix section B.10, a default non-compliant
policy, will try to match the first pattern. If it succeeds, it will make an assertion
if it finds any of the successive patterns, and will go to the default if it finds none
of them. It walks though the patterns one after the other, as links in a chain. The
sample policy states:
e If a user wishes to RETRIEVE any attribute of type example: name, the user must
- USE an attribute of type example: age, OR
- RETRIEVE an attribute of type example: dob, OR
- USE an attribute of type example: ssn, OR
- Include a filter of the form example: age > 18.
More generally, chaining specifies a policy of the form "if A matches, take action
if B or C or ... is found." A, B, C, ... can be either a USE or RETRIVE, and "take
action" is either "assert compliance" or "assert noncompliance". To match a pattern
that is not some form of USE or RETRIEVE, the administrator would need to code
this manually; there is no facility in the user interface for the input of a pattern.
Furthermore, since the reasoner only looks at the queries to a system, and not their
results, making policies that fire if certain data is in the database is not possible. As
an example, consider a policy that says, "you may not RETRIEVE any attribute of
type example: name if the value of name is John." We can't check to see that a name
has value John, so we can't use exclusion here. What we might do instead is to create
a policy that requires a user to specify "example: name ! John" in every query they
submit.
Chaining is helpful when an administrator would like to provisionally provide
access to a certain attribute. With a chaining policy, the administrator can require
a particular filter or other pattern to be present in order for compliance. Since this
works at the granularity of a single query, using a history does not make sense for
this policy!
Default Deny
The last of the primitives for automatic policy generation, default deny allows an
administrator to impose limitations on all queries. Whereas all of the previous policies
made no assumption about the size of the world by assuming an open world, default
deny imposes strong restrictions by closing the space of possible queries to only match
a few particular patterns. This is analogous to the GRANT feature of SQL databases,
which explicitly enables permissions to a particular field. This policy family is called
"default deny" because any pattern that it does not expressly enumerate is, by default,
not compliant with the policy.
The sample default deny policy in appendix section B. 11 states that a user's query
is compliant only if every single triple pattern in its translation matches one of the
following patterns, where [ ] is a wildcard that can match anything:
* [ ] example:name [ ]
* [ ] example:age [
* [ ] example:dob [
* [ ] example:ssn [
Implicitly, this policy allows a user to RETRIEVE or USE any of these attributes,
to use filters, or to peform any operation that specifically matches one of those four
patterns.
In practice, a default deny policy can set the ground rules for access to a particular
data set. By explicitly giving permissions to certain triple patterns, the administrator
can guarantee closure on the policies. In conjunction with the other template policies,
an administrator can offer a level of access between 'all' and 'none'.
3.2.3 Automatic Policy Generation
The table that follows demonstrates how the aforementioned policy templates gen-
erate policies based on user input. The purpose of the table is to show how the
generation of all policies is similar, and how each policy scales with multiple vari-
ables. The author prepared these tables to provide a reference for implementing each
policy template.
There are two tables: one for USE policies, and one for RETRIEVE policies.
Along the top row of each table are the five policy types. Each table is divided in
half: the top half of each table demonstrates what happens if a user enters a single
variable type or attribute (say type: A), and the bottom half shows what happens
if a user enters two or more variable types or attributes (say type: A, type: B, and
possible type: C). The three rows - AIR Rule, Description, Action - explain how a
policy gets generated, and what it does. The AIR Rule(s) row shows the snippet of
AIR code that forms the important part of the policy. Some policies require several
AIR rules to express their functionality, particularly those with multiple variables.
The table illustrates AIR code that would appear in separate rules by separating it
with a blank line (two newlines). In reality, each policy contains a large amount of
boilerplate code, but this snippet really defines the policy. The Description row offerse
a terse explanation of the effect of the policy, and the Action row shows what action
the reasoner takes when it matches the code in the Rule row. All of these policies
depend on a boilerplate that defines :Q as a s: SPARQLQuery, with a s: retrieve part
:P and a s:clause part :W.
As an example, consider a policy where an administrator wants to create an Inclu-
sion policy, which specifies that a user must either USE type: A and type: B together
in a query, or not at all. The chart demonstrates how the policy generator will create
this policy. This is a USE policy, so the template is listed in the USE table. It is
an Inclusion policy, which is the third column from the left. This policy mentions
multiple variables, so the information that describes it is in the bottom half of the
table. In particular, three cells describe the AIR Rule(s), the Description, and the
Action of this policy. The AIR Rule(s) row tells us that this policy will have three
separate AIR rules that perform pattern matching: one that looks for both type:A
and type: B used together, and one each looking for type: A or type: B. The Descrip-
tion row tells us what the policy tries to accomplish, and the Action row describes
the action the reasoner takes upon a match between the policy and the query.
Some policies support a "hybrid", whereby a policy can act on a query that tries
to USE some attribute(s) and tries to RETRIEVE some other attribute(s). These
cases are listed in the Notes row of the USE table. Some policy types do not make
sense, so the table marks them as unsupported.
USE Restriction USE Inclusion USE Exclusion USE Chaining USE Default Deny
Single AIR rule(s) :W s:triplePattern :T. Unsupported. Unsupported. :W s:triplePattern :Ti. :W s:triplePattern :T.
:T log:includes [] type:SSN :V . :T1 log:includes [] type:A :V1 . :T log:notlncludes [I type:A []
:W s:triplePattern :U. :W s:triplePattern :Ui.
:U log:includes :V [] . :U1 log:includes :V1 [] [] .
:W s:triplePattern :T2.
:T log:includes [] type:B :V2
:W s:triplePattern :U2.
:U2 log:includes *V2 [] [] .
Description Cannot use anything of type:A. - If using type:A, must not use May only use type:A.
type:B.
Action air:assert :Q air:non-compliant- - If first rule matches, assert Assert non-compliance, since
with :Whatever-Policy non-compliance if second rule you found something other than
matches. Default is compliance. type:A. No distinction between
(Can have negated version as USE and RETRIEVE.
well.)
Multiple AIR rule(s) :W s:triplePattern :Ti. :W s:triplePattern :Ti. :W s:triplePattern :Ti. :W s:triplePattern :Ti. :W s:triplePattern :T.
:T1 log:includes [] type:A :V1 . :T1 log:includes [} type:A :V1 . :T log:includes [] type:A V1 :T1 logincludes [] type:A V1 :T log:notlnclodes [] type:A
:W s:triplePattern :Ui. :W s:triplePattern :U1. :W s:triplePattern Ul. :W s:triplePattern U1.
:U1 log:includes :V1 ] [] . :U1 log:includes :V1 [] [] . :Ui log:includes V1 3] 3] . :Ui log:includes V ] :T log:notlncludes type:B
:W s:triplePattern :T2. :W s:triplePattern :T2.
:W s:triplePattern :T2. :T log:includes [] type:B :V2 . :T log:includes ] type:B :V2 :W s:triplePattern :T2.
:T log:includes [] type:B :V2 . :W s:triplePattern :U2. :W s:triplePattern :U2. :T log:includes [] type:B :V2
:W s:triplePattern :U2. :U2 log:includes :V2 [ ] . :U2 log:includes 2 :W s:triplePattern :U2.
:U2 log:includes :V2 }2 log:includes :V2
:W s:triplePattern :Ti.
:T1 log:includes [] type:A :V1 :W s:triplePattern T3.
:W s:triplePattern :Ul. :T log:includes [3 type:C :3
U1 log:includes :V1 ] :W s:triplePattern :U3.
:U3 log:includes :V[
:W s:triplePattern :T2.
:T log:includes [] type:B .2
:W s:triplePattern :U2.
U:U2 log:includes :V2 [] ] .
Description Cannot use anything of type:A If using type:A, must also0 use Cannot use type:A and type:B. If using type:A must not use May only use type:A or type:B.
or type:B. Action is taken if any type:B. All or none. Generalizes to MAX(N-i,N) type:B or type:C.
pattern matches. Defaults to
compliance. loginclus [] t : :2 .
Actin air:assert :Q air:non-compliant- Assert compliance if first
with :Whatever- Policy tern is met. Assert non- compliance if any of the follow- you found something other than
compliance if any remaining ing rules match. Default is com- type:A or type:B. No distinction
patterns are met. Assert com- pliance. (Can have negated ver- between USE and RETRIEVE.
pliance if no patterns at all are sion as well.)
met.
Notes :Q a s:SPARQLQuery; We can create hyhrid policies, We can create hybrid policies, Hybrids possible. Can only Hyhrids possible. Can simplify
s:retrieve :P; i.e. "if using type:A must re- i.e. "may do all but one of: use have one type on the left hand to 3] type:X 33 for "any access".
s:clause :W. trieve type:B and vice versa". type:A, retrieve type:B". side. Doing an AND is easy, the USE or RETRIEVE are special
OR involves comhinatorics. We cases.
can have mandatory filters us-
:T lg thisnpolicy. [}type:C:V3
Table 3.3: Automatic policy generation: USE.
RETRIEVE Restriction RETRIEVE Inclusion RETRIEVE Exclusion RETRIEVE Chaining RETRIEVE Default Deny
Single AIR Rule(s) :P s:var :V. Unsupported. Unsupported. :P s:var :V1.
:W s:triplePattern :T1. :W s:triplePattern :T1.
:T1 log:includes [] type:A :V1 :T1 log:includes [] type:A :V1
:P s:var :V2.
:W s:triplePattern :T2.
:T2 log:includes [] type:B :V2
Description Cannot see type:A, it is re- - If retrieve type:A, must not re-
stricted. trieve type:B.
Action air:assert :Q air:non-compliant- None None If first rule matches, assert No distinction between USE
with :Whatever-Policy non-compliance if second rule and RETRIEVE. See USE ta-
matches, and compliance if sec- ble.
ond rule fails.
Multiple AIR Rule(s) :P s:var :V1. :P s:var Vi. :P s:var V. :P s:var V1.
:W striplePattern Ti. :W s:triplePattern Ti. :W s:triplePattern T. :W s:triplePattern Ti.
:TI log:includes [] type:A :V1 T log:includes [] type:A V1 :Ti log:includes [I type:A Vi Ti log:includes [] type:A Vi
s:var :V2. :P .
:P s:var :V2. :W s:triplePattern :T2. :W s:triplePattern :T2. :P s:var :V2.
:W s:triplePattern :T2. :T2 log:includes [] type:B :V2 :T2 log:includes [] type:A :V2 :W s:triplePattern :T2.
:T2 log:includes [] type:B :V2 :T2 log:includes [] type:B :V2
Cnos:var sVi.
W s:triplePattern aT. rP svar V.
oT log:includes [] type:A Vi :W s:triplePattern aT.
:Ti log:includes [] type:C :V3
:P s:var :V2.
:W s:triplePattern :T2.
:T2 log:includes [] type:B :V2
Description Cannot see type: A or~type:B9, If retrieving t-y-p-e:A,must also Cannot retrieve -type:A and If retrieve type:A must not re-
they are restricted. Take action use type:B. All or none. type:B. Generalizes to MAX(N- trieve type:B or type:C.
of any pattern matches. iN):s
Action air:assert :Q air:non-compliant- Assert compliance if first -pat- Asert non-compliance. If first rule miiatches, assert non- No distinction -between USE
with :Whatever- Policy tern is met. Assert non- compliance if any of the follow- and RETRIEVE. See USE ta-
compliance is any remaining ing rules match, and compliance ble.
patterns are met. Assert com- if they all fail.
pliance if no patterns at all are
met.
Notes We can create hybrid policies, We can create hybrid policies, Hybrids possible. Can only Hybrids possible. Can simplify
i.e. "if using type:A must re- i.e. "may do all but one of: use have one type on the left hand to [] type:X [] for "any access".
trieve type:B and vice versa". type:A, retrieve type:B". side. Doing an AND is easy, the USE or RETRIEVE are special
OR involves combinatorics. We cases.
can have mandatory filters us-
ing this policy.
Table 3.4: Automatic policy generation: RETRIEVE.
3.2.4 Query History with check-compliance
This project supports query histories. The history is a record of every query that
a user has made, that can be used when checking for compliance with a query. In
fact, exclusion is the only policy for which it makes sense to use the query history;
moreover, exclusion should always use the query history. It is important to note that
the query history is not always helpful. Restriction never needs it, since single queries
simply fail. Inclusion does not need it either, since one query must always contain all
of the terms. Chaining should leave history disabled, since having used a condition in
the past doesn't guarantee that the current query is compliant. Default deny never
needs it, since its behavior is so similar to restriction.
We implement query history as follows.
1. User calls "check-compliance POLICY NEW-QUERY QUERY-DESC" wrapper
script. POLICY is an AIR policy; NEW-QUERY is a query in n3, perhaps the
output of the sparql2n3 script, and QUERY-DESC is a file like query-req.n3
that defines the location of the query and history files.
2. Wrapper script appends NEW-QUERY to the history file in QUERY-DESC,
say, history.n3. This accomplishes three things:
* we only need to look at QUERY-HISTORY when reasoning, making it
much easier to automatically generate policies that only grow linearly with
the number of terms.
" AIR will explicitly know which query is the current (new) query.
" This guarantees that the QUERY-HISTORY is never empty, eliminating
a tricky edge case.
3. Wrapper script writes NEW-QUERY to a file, say, query.n3.
4. Wrapper script calls policyrunner.py, and returns the output of policyrunner.py
for viewing.
5. Optional. If policy is non compliant, we can remove it from the history file.
This approach is sufficient, and preserves correct AIR semantics of the query and
the history.
3.2.5 Policy Generation User Interface
The template policies defined above allow a user to easily generate policies. In order
to do so, a user interacts with the policy generator. Depending on the policy, a user
inputs variables to catch, whether to act on a USE or a RETRIEVE, a policy name,
a policy description, and if necessary, whether or not the query ought to be history
enable.
3.2.6 Compliance Testing and Browser Presentation in Tab-
ulator
Tabulator is a Firefox browser plugin that enhances Semantic Web data. In this
project, it performs two functions. One, it organizes the display of a policy and the of
the policy runner, in a form that is readable hy a human. Figure 3-4 demonstrates this
functionality. Tabulator also makes it easier for a user to understand the reasoning
generated, as figure 3-5 demonstrates.
The majority of the features discussed in this section are the work of Oshani
Seneviratne, as it falls under the umbrella of her ongoing Tabulator work. Screenshots
of the Tabulator UI are in figures 3-4 and 3-5.
3.2.7 Implementation Note
With so many tools written in different languages and offering very specialized func-
tionalities, it was necessary to write some simple tools to tie them all together. The
scripts provide additional functionality, such as query conversion from SPARQL to
N3, query history functionality, and template-based policy generation. Various scripts
power the translator, the compliance checker, the policy generator, and user-facing
Web pages. We discuss the functionality and design choices of those wrappers here;
their full source is in the appendix.
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3.3 Summary
This chapter explained the functionality of the system. It can convert SPARQL
queries to N3. It defines a set of primitive policy types. It allows a user to easily
create queries, possibly using information about an existing database. It can enable
logging of queries. It allows a user to check a query against a policy for compliance.
Finally, it allows a user to understand the compliance explanation generated by a
policy runner. In sum, this is a complete, end to end system for policy assurance,
that is ready to be integrated into an RDBMS.
All of the code in this section and the appendix are available in the MIT CSAIL
Decentralized Information Group's code repository. Please contact a member of DIG
for access.
Chapter 4
Performance
In any practical system, performance is a concern. This project focused on providing
a functional implementation of a policy assurance system, and achieved that goal.
In terms of performance, the only optimization we performed was to ensure that
the query history grows linearly with the number of queries, and that policies grow
linearly with the number of items that they check.
It is relatively easy to write policies that grow faster than would be feasible to
implement. For example, one of the primitives that we originally sought to implement
was a MAX(m, n) rule, meaning, "given n fields, the user may only see up to m of
them." This policy is trivial in the case of MAX(n - 1, n), in that the only way
to trigger it is to access all n fields. However, the current AIR language would
require that for a general implementation of MAX(m, n), we check every possible
combination. This is due to the fact that AIR is a production rule system and
does not maintain any state. Thus, a straightforward rule like MAX(m, n) grows
exponentially with (m - n).
With the help of Yotam Aron, we ran a series of tests using the history policy and
the AIR reasoner. The time values listed are the times given by the AIR reasoner
itself; there may be more accurate ways of measuring run time. We have found that
the way we write queries will influence the running time of our checks. The AIR
reasoner abhors complexity, so any attempt to limit the patterns that it checks will
help it to run faster. The reasoner runs faster with a smaller history file. We can
Items in Query History Reasoning After Loading Actual Reasoning
0 1.43096 1.094741 1.0751231
1 1.52762 1.32497 1.307404
2 1.7949221 1.601938 1.584473133
3 2.3070598 2.0158172 1.99806
4 2.728109121 2.513138056 2.495877981
5 3.490919828 3.255658865 3.238258839
6 4.528033018 4.235877991 4.218565941
7 5.564540863 5.312869072 5.295244932
8 7.044108152 6.777283192 6.759871006
9 8.317480087 8.051841974 8.028425932
10 10.18744802 9.915023088 9.896337986
11 12.22676992 11.94390798 11.925632
12 15.13193297 14.83994699 14.82177997
13 17.82276082 17.52010894 17.502671
14 21.40320492 21.10541201 21.087852
15 24.56065702 24.24677181 24.22919488
16 29.64700389 29.2435019 29.17709184
17 33.9228971 33.52368808 33.4938252
18 44.79428411 44.41020393 44.35875702
19 50.51201296 50.00673199 49.98922586
Table 4.1: Running time, in seconds, of unoptimized queries.
tailor our policies to shrink the size of air:pattern fields at the expense
more rules.
of creating
Yotam ran one test suite running Ubuntu on VMWare. Resources allocated: 512
MB memory, 12GB hard disk space. The results are in table 4.1.
Yotam then ran one additional test suite running Ubuntu on VMWare. Resources
allocated: 768 MB memory, 12GB hard disk space. Despite the difference in memory
allocation, this shows a good trend, with better scaling for a large history. The results
are in table 4.2.
We can clearly see exponential growth toward the right hand side of these figures.
At present, this is the greatest impediment to scaling. Future changes or optimizations
to the reasoner could help this run faster.
In practice, our finds show that it would be difficult for a policy to perform any
matching against more than about 100 terms at a time. Any policy that does not
support query history will likely begin to have difficulty with a perticularly complex
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Figure 4-1: Unoptimized policy run time from table 4.1.
Items in Query History Reasoning After Loading Actual Reasoning
0 1.548950911 1.343198061 1.324027061
1 1.335716963 1.097095966 1.078705072
2 1.426616192 1.18595314 1.159878016
3 1.465291023 1.198924065 1.178475857
4 1.604300976 1.294827938 1.275640965
5 1.621567011 1.348763943 1.330348969
10 2.188154936 1.863446951 1.843798876
15 2.896314144 2.549362183 2.529920101
20 3.677877903 3.288823843 3.269448996
25 4.998191118 4.573461056 4.555090189
30 6.7367239 6.265938997 6.247066021
40 12.97512007 12.29570103 12.26716304
50 21.24516296 20.6023891 20.57518101
60 31.52937508 30.80437517 30.78589511
70 47.03233194 46.23697996 46.211133
80 63.81845903 62.74732184 62.72839189
90 93.3954649 92.36639786 92.34837484
100 117.659286 116.265708 116.2480021
200 864.6837819 862.648648 862.6293769
Table 4.2: Running time, in seconds, of optimized queries.
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Figure 4-2: Unoptimized policy run time from table 4.2. Note log scale on the X axis.
query that accesses on the order of 100 different variables. A policy that supports a
query history will have difficulty if there are on the order of 100 queries in said history.
A more robust machine might bump these figures by an order of magnitude, but these
seem to be the limitations of our system with hardware available today. Thus, it is
likely that an enterprise environment looking to implement this software will hit its
performance limitations relatively quickly, without additional, out-of-system means
in place to mitigate its limitations.
Chapter 5
Related and Prior Work
This chapter presents some of the prior methodologies in database security, as well as
other uses of Semantic Web technology in this field. There is some overlap between
this and preceding chapters.
5.1 Policy Awareness
The Information Accountability paper [10] describes the arenas in which policy-aware
systems are if interest. Among these are privacy, copyright, surveillance, and data
mining. The paper argues that if we can trace who uses data and how they use it, if
we have a way of finding accountability, we can begin to move toward policies that are
between full disclosure and full control. The paper offers scenarios of how information
aware systems would be useful in everyday life.
REIN [14] (Rei and N3, named after the Rei policy specification language and the
Notation 3 language) describes a system offering "policy management". The system
is policy-language agnostic, and operates in an independent environment, offering a
yes/no opinion of policy compliance to an existing system. The REIN paper defines
three possible operating modes. In the server-side rules operating mode, the analogy
of choice is an application for a library card. The user does not know the rules,
but supplies the information requested on the form to the library for processing.
In the client-side rules mode, the onus of rule checking is on the user. The hybrid
mode offers a way of sharing this responsibility. At present, REIN is implemented in
Python, using the N3 policy language and the CWM reasoner.
There is prior work demonstrating the use of a policy-aware system for checking
license information. [15] [16] In this case, the system uses Creative Commons license
policies to check for compliance with the content creator's sharing preferences. This
system is a way of "keeping honest people honest." The system, as implemented,
converts meta data on an image file to an AIR policy, and checks usage patterns
against a set of rules that parallel the Creative Commons license policies. If, for
example, an image from the Flickr Web site is used on someones personal page,
in violation of the content creator's wishes as expressed in their choice of Creative
Commons licensing, this tool will detect a conflict.
5.2 Methodologies of Access Control
It is instructive to look at the approaches systems designers take in designing tradi-
tional access control systems. Systems designers tend to have a different mind set
when approaching security problems than Web designers: systems designers tend to
favor closed systems, whereas Web designers tend to favor open systems. Existing
relational database systems extend on these technologies in their implementation of
access control.
5.2.1 Mandatory and Discretionary Access Control
The traditional models of access control, circa the mid 1980s, consist of mandatory
access control, or MAC, and discretionary access control, or DAC. The origins of MAC
lie in secure military systems, as a way to enforce permissions on proprietary, secured,
confidential data. [7] In an MAC system, the only way to gain access to data is to
expressly have an outside authority grant access. There is absolutely no provision for
an end user to alter permissions on data. The primitives for enforcing access control
extend deep into the design of the operating system. MAC systems explicitly define
rings of access. Some secure Unix operating systems, including SELinux, utilize MAC
design principles.
Discretionary access control is a design principle that allows a user to show that
they have the credentials to access data. [7]Users have the capability of modifying
their own permissions, or the permissions of others. A widespread example of a
DAC system is that of Unix style permissions. On Unix systems, everything, from
devices to network sockets to data on a disk, is represented as a file. Every file has
three sets of permissions: those for the owning user, for the owning group, and for
everyone else. Each of these sets may be granted (or denied) permissions to read,
write, and/or execute a file. The operating system checks the user's credentials and
the file's permissions before enabling an operation. Access Control Lists (ACLs) are
another example of a DAC system. There is prior work investigating the use of DAC
in object-oriented databases. [6] Such a security model works well for general purpose
computing, but not in all scenarios.
The excessive rigors in the implementation of a MAC system, and the inadequacy
of a DAC system, have led systems researchers to newer design philosophies that
allow finer granularity in security settings.
5.2.2 Role Based Access Control
In the early 1990s, systems researchers began to find practical limitations in the
expressive power of the discretionary access control model. Researchers presented role
based access control as a more secure, easy to implement alternative to discretionary
access control. [8] Role based access control is a form of mandatory access control, in
that users obtain their permissions from an outside authority. The primary difference
is in the structure of permissions. In role based access control, a user can be assigned
to one (or more, in some implementations) "roles". As an example, a user in a
large company might wear several hats throughout their time in the company, from
"human resources associate" to "financial associate" to "systems analyst". Each of
these roles requires a different set of permissions. The formal description of role
based access control, demonstrated in the paper, shows the power and flexibility of
assigning roles rather than individual permissions. It is particularly well suited to
assigning permissions where a high user turnover rate is present.
5.2.3 Rule- and Policy-Based Access Control
Rule based access control is an extension and a generalization of role based access
control. Instead of simple roles, we can use rules and logic to derive whether or not a
particular agent should have access to a particular resource. As an example, consider
a student trying to access a secured Web page. The student may have credentials
saying, "I am a graduate student", "my adviser is Professor Smith", and "I am a
member of Research Group X". The page may have a set of rules defining access: it
may be restricted to individuals who are members of certain research groups, and also
graduate students. Different versions of the page may exist based on the credentials
used. REIN [14] and SWRL [9] provide sample implementations of policy based
access control. This thesis mimics the RBAC approach, using a similar methodology
to define and process rules.
5.3 Prior Work in Relational Databases
This project seeks to address a particular shortcoming in database systems at present.
In order to enforce access control policies, the database must be able to see the queries
that a user is making against the database. This poses a problem when the queries
themselves may reveal sensitive data. Access control lists are insufficient in this
regard, whereas misuse and intrusion detection efforts are more closely related with
our work.
5.3.1 Access Control Lists
Modern relational database management systems utilize some form of discretionary
or role-based access control to regulate access to tables, using some form of access
control list. The database administrator may restrict database access to particular
rows or columns in particular tables, may grant or deny read and write permissions,
and may limit the user to executing particular queries. [5] In effect, all of these systems
limit the user to seeing a particular subset of the data in the database.
It follows that the structure of the access control policy must closely follow the
structure of the data itself. The structure of the security policy may divulge secure
information, and may not be tolerant of changes to the underlying structure of the
database.
5.3.2 Access Control Features In A Modern RDBMS
Modern RDBMS packages, such as Oracle, offer a wide variety of access control
features. We can roughly group them into five categories. [17] [18] [19]
" Privileges
* Views
" Stored Procedures
* Roles
" Virtual Private Databases
Privileges explicitly grant access to perform an action on a particular database
object. A database administrator, or a user with appropriate privileges, can grant
or revoke privileges. A view is a dynamic table, the output of a particular query
against the database. A stored procedure is a particular command, like a user defined
function, provided for database access. A role, as described in the preceeding section
on role-based access control, is a type of meta-user that helps congregate database
permissions. A virtual private database is a form of information hiding, partitioning
the database such that a user only sees certain data.
These systems are able to specify access rights for users and groups on databases,
and work well enough in the majority of usage cases. However, this design is not with-
out its limitations. The access policies must closely follow the structure of the data,
in many cases involving the database administrator to know a great deal about the
structure of the tables. Changes to the layout of data will break previously defined
policies. Privileges can be granted or revoked in a conflicting fashion, often making
it difficult to determine correct access. Views and virtual private databases may be
overly restricting, preventing honest individuals from carrying out their responsibili-
ties. Our work seeks to address the numerous limitations with systems of this design
by introducing a more flexible, more abstract means for defining permissions.
5.3.3 Misuse and Intrusion Detection
There is prior work in the field of intrusion detection systems in databases. Intru-
sion detection researchers argue that, though an outsider threat is very real, current
databases do little to guard against violations of policy conducted by a trusted insider
with database access. Detection of Misuse in Database Systems (DEMIDS) [20] was
one of the first systems to detect potential misuse in a database system. By moni-
toring queries, using audit logs, and determining a frequent item set, the DEMIDS
system is able to guess whether or not a particular access by a particular user is likely
to be permitted. This approach suffers from a granularity issue: with too high or too
low granularity, it is likely that the system will see a high number of false positive
policy violations, or respectively, a high number of false negatives.
Later systems expand on some of the DEMIDS ideas, adding better learning or
classification techniques. Cathey et. al. [21] developed a system that uses a combi-
nation of user query profile learning, abnormal query behavior detection, clustering
documents, clustering query results, and relevance feedback to better understand
how particular users and groups access a database. Over time, Cathey's system will
"learn" common access patterns. Kamra et. al. [22] extend this theme further, re-
quiring the use of role-based access control, and using a naive Bayes classifier to learn
standard access patterns. Their approach argues that, by only considering roles in-
stead of individual users or tables, the granularity is correct. Kamra's paper also
argues against a formal definition of intrusion detection, saying that the intrusion de-
tection application is much more purpose-built, and therefore less suited to a formal
approach. The aforementioned techniques would be helpful in the initial instrumen-
tation of rule sets, by finding common ways that users access data.
5.4 Alteration of Data
An orthogonal approach to security of certain kinds of sensitive data is the alteration
of the data itself. If we restrict the utility of the data through alteration, we can, in
theory, limit the usefulness of the data, its sensitivity, and its potential for damage.
The classic example of this approach is the use of a heavy black marker to manually
censor sensitive government documents prior to public release. There has been some
research into formalizing and automating this process.
Sweeney has published a great deal of research on this particular topic. k-
anonymity [23] [24] offers a formal approach to the de-identification process. A data
set that offers k-anonymity for some k is constructed such that, for every attribute
(column), there are at least k occurrences of that attribute (rows). Phrased differently,
a data set of census data would be anonymous for k = 2 if there were at least two
occurrences of each name, address, age, and so on. By setting a value of k, dependent
on the application, we can guarantee difficulty in re-creating and de-identifying the
data set. Datafly [25] is a system that can de-identify data automatically, removing
singletons, changing social security numbers (SSNs) and dates of birth, changing ZIP
codes, and the like.
De-identification and privacy problems are nothing new to the biomedical in-
formatics world. Access to, and use of, medical data faces heavy regulation, most
prominently from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
of 1996. The Multi-parameter Intelligent Monitoring for Intensive Care database, or
MIMIC II (http://mimic.mit.edu/) is a database, provided by an MIT research
group, for research purposes. The MIMIC group has published many papers dis-
cussing and evaluating different de-identification algorithms.
With access to the database, our system could potentially anonymize data using
any of a number of well known techniques. This would allow us to keep original data,
and only serve data that is as specific as it needs to be for a particular application.
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Chapter 6
Future Directions
This work is a solid beginning for future work in Semantic Web based policy assurance.
It is also just that: a beginning. There are some important pieces of this project that
need to be addressed, and some interesting applications that are just beginning to
scratch the surface of what is possible with our reasoner. In this chapter, we discuss
future work related to this project in this chapter. This is just a sample of the
directions in which this work may grow.
6.1 SPARQL Endpoint Integration
The policy assurance implementation in this paper serves as a standalone component.
As we mentioned in the earlier Policy Assurance section, an important future step
is to integrate this work with a SPARQL endpoint to demonstrate compliance with
incoming queries in real time. To do this, the endpoint would need to be able to look
at the AIR reasoner's output, and pull compliance information from that output.
A particular endpoint could perform verification using a local or online reasoner,
depending on the application specific needs.
6.2 SQL Support
The majority of databases in production use the SQL query language. In order to
be compatible with most existing database implementations, our project needs to be
able to handle SQL queries. There are several pieces that need to come together for
SQL to be a supported language. First, we would need to find a way to translate SQL
queries to N3. The SPASQL project (cite) provides for mapping SPARQL queries to
SQL. This translation needs more research attention to determine the challenges for
converting SQL, or at least a portion thereof to SPARQL. (A conversation with Eric
Prud'hommeaux suggests that a one-pass approach may be insufficient, and that this
could be a Ph.D. thesis topic.) Secondly, we need a way of describing the fields in a
SQL table using URIs.
6.3 Completing and Porting the N3 Translator
The current SPARQL to N3 translation does not support GRAPH, nor does it com-
pletely support the built in functions of SPARQL, or nested queries. Furthermore,
the current one-pass approach Instead of a mere re-serialization of the SPARQL query
in one pass, it may be necessary to perform additional processing. With more mod-
ification to the swobjects code base, multiple pass translation is possible, enabling a
much richer translation.
The swobjects approach to query translation was convenient, since the author
had easy access to the main developer of swobjects, but it may not be ideal. The
majority of the code used in this project, including the reasoner and various scripts,
are in Python. The fyzz project [26] implements a SPARQL lexer and parser in
Python. This recent project may offer better integration into the rest of the project,
allowing a unified query toolkit.
6.4 Policy Generation from Natural Language
Some of Oshani Seneviratne's previous work deals with parsing natural language. It
should be possible to parse natural language, or at least a constrained version thereof,
in such a way that we could automatically generate policies from that. Using natural
language as input would be a great benefit to the usability of this system.
6.5 Semantic Policies
Our collaborators at Lincoln Lab proposed implementing policies which perform rea-
soning in order to deduce a conclusion. Instead of directly specifying, "do not allow
address searches where CITY equals Boston," we can more vaguely specify "do not
allow searches in Boston." With an appropriate set of assumptions and data, the rea-
soner would be able to piece together that Boston contains streets, neighborhoods,
ZIP codes, etc. Yotam Aron's work is exploring these possibilities directly, by en-
coding knowledge bases for the reasoner. A long term goal would be to adapt the
reasoner to use existing ontologies in drawing conclusions.
6.6 Database Description
To make things simpler for a user, this project should support loading a database
ontology to automatically populate the fields in the policy generation user interface.
This reduces duplicated effort, as well as reducing the possibility of simple typograph-
ical errors. The database ontology is an N3 description of the attributes in a database,
with some pre-defined filters.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Thoughts
The problem of policy assurance is one of transparency, accountability, and correct-
ness. The classic approach to sensitive security issues has always been a very black-
and-white "all or none": either data is visible, or it is restricted. In a modern and
inter-disciplinary world, adding more shades of gray to the possibilities for security
is increasingly important. The security approach that we describe in this thesis does
not simply ask who a user is, but also what they are trying to see. At present, SQL
database security operates on the level of a table. At best, we can grant or deny
access to particular rows and columns of a table, but the limitation is still a table: a
flat, two-dimensional structure.
The Semantic Web works with data that comes, not in table form, but in graph
form. The Semantic Web is built on top of the Web, with its myriad of interconnected
links. By using Semantic Web technologies, we can begin to define policies that act
not simply on tables, but on a more complex, more abstract data set. Furthermore,
we can define policies that are as fine-grained as individual terms in a query.
By looking at queries, this project takes a different approach than other database
security initiatives. This system can operate completely externally to a database, or
function as an addition. It can protect sensitive data contained in user queries by de-
sign. It provides a human- and machine-readable "paper trail" that gives more explicit
information about policies to users and auditors, while allowing enough freedom for
administrators to easily create interesting policies. This design gives a performance
benefit: by looking at queries and not results, the system can save a heavily loaded
database server from executing queries that are not compliant, and would be a use of
valuable cycles.
Our approach is particularly valuable in multi-tiered environments containing
highly sensitive data, where different parties have different access privileges and dif-
ferent access needs. This approach minimizes the amount of information in a log, to
the information that is strictly needed to verify a particular assertion. This improves
usability and reduces the risk of data leakage, by showing an auditor everything they
need to see, and nothing they don't. This is a boon, as it allows even more levels of
access, potentially enabling new workflows.
The specific approach of this project was to check query patterns. We converted
SPARQL queries to the N3 language, and provided a tool for doing so. We wrote
policies in the AIR language, and provided tools to help an administrator write their
own policies according to our boilerplate. We provided a way to check the queries
against the policies, using the Firefox Web browser. The system achieves the goal of
usability and scalability.
Of course, this system is not without its limitations. The current implementation
scales reasonably well for hundreds or thousands of entities, but not for millions of
entities. Some important future work will add needed performance and usability
improvements.
It is our hope that this system will eventually see utilization in production, and
will grow over time. The author can only begin to imagine the possibilities for this
system.
"Share and enjoy."
-Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy
Appendix A
Background Technologies
Data on the World Wide Web is readily available to human agents, but notoriously
for machines to interpret. The Semantic Web is an ongoing initiative to develop Web-
based data systems that are easily readable by both humans and machines. Common
tactics for achieving this goal include tagging data, linking data, and writing software
to draw conclusions on data.
This project draws heavily on Semantic Web technologies. In this chapter, I
discuss the Semantic Web initiative as well as several technologies that were used in
this project. This overview is far from exhaustive, as there are a large number of
technologies that comprise the Semantic Web vision; rather, this summary is here to
explain the suitability of the technologies chosen, as well as to provide an introduction
to these technologies for the reader.
A.1 Semantic Web Overview
A.1.1 The Vision
"The Semantic Web is not a separate Web but an extension of the current
one, in which information is given well-defined meaning, better enabling
computers and people to work in cooperation."
-Tim Berners-Lee. From [27]
Figure A-1: Semantic Web "layer cake," showing how components relate [2].
In broad terms, the Semantic Web is a set of extensions to the current World Wide
Web designed to make it easier for automated systems to interact data, and thus, to
make it easier for humans to interact with data. The goal is to provide tools that
make it possible to improve data handling in a large, heterogeneous, decentralized
environment such as the Web. The current strategy is to provide tools that allow us
to describe data, and tools that perform reasoning over data.
The Semantic Web development effort has directly led to a number of technologies
[28] that enable data markup, ontology definition, and other useful tasks. These tools
extend existing systems (such as the HTML language), and serve as adaptations of
other technologies (such as XML).
Developments in the Semantic Web effort have produced a way of naming abstract
concepts, a way of describing concepts using other concepts or literals, and a way of
finding descriptions and matching patterns. More importantly, these technologies
make it much easier for both human and machine agents to read, reason on, and
operate upon data. In a world that is ever more interdisciplinary, being able to
connect disparate data is a boon.
Semantic Web technologies are moving out of the realm of research and into
.. .... . ...........
commercial production. Adobe offers tools to embed RDF metadata in a number
of formats [29]. The Creative Commons license [30] embeds RDF metadata that
helps determine usage rights for media. Major Web search engines as of this mid-2009
writing, such as Google, bing, and Wolfram Alpha, employ Semantic Web technologies
to help improve the quality of search results. RDF triples are becoming popular in
the biomedical and intelligence communities, where collaboration between disciplines
is crucial to success.
A.1.2 The URI
The Uniform Resource Identifier, or URI, is the unique technology that enables nam-
ing on the Web [31]. A URI may serve as a pointer to a resource, be it a Web page,
an e-mail address, the location of a music file, the name of a service. A URI may
point to something that does not exist. Regardless of its destination, a URI serves as
a unique identifier in the Web world.
A URI enables us to refer to items in a namespace as well. The idea of "URI as
a name" is a crucial cornerstone of the Semantic Web. For example, let us consider
the following URI:
http://www.example.org/
This URI points to a resource that might be located there. Now, let's create a
simple ontology for describing things that I might find at a local grocery store:
http://www.example.org/grocery#banana
http://www.example.org/grocery#apple
http://www.example.org/grocery#spaghetti
Each of these URIs contains value itself. When I resolve the URI, and fetch
the resource to which it points, I may find a textual description of a banana, or
a photograph of an apple, or nutritional information about spaghetti. I may find
nothing at all.
I can capture the design pattern of common prefixes as a name space. Instead of
repeating ourselves, let us define the "grocery" namespace as the set of URIs that
begin with "http: //www. example. org/grocery".
A.1.3 HTML, the HyperText Markup Language, and XML,
the eXtensible Markup Language
The Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) serves as the backbone language of the
World Wide Web. As a markup language, it provides a standardized way of creating
Web documents that users can read with any of a number of programs, including
Web browsers. HTML's characteristic property is its ability to encapsulate data with
a pre-defined set of tags, easily recognizable with angle brackets. A common tag may
look like this:
<a href="http://www.example.com/> Example Home Page </a>
The Extensible Markup Language, or XML, enables an unlimited amount of ad-
ditional expressivity in the form of arbitrary user-created tags. I can nest XML tags
within one another, allowing us to represent arbitrary tree structures in the language.
As an example, I can create a grocery list, building upon the previous example.
<grocerylist>
<item moreinfo="http: //www. example. org/grocery#banana" quantity="5">
Bananas</item>
<item moreinfo="http: //www. example. org/grocery#apple" quantity="2">
Apples</item>
</grocerylist>
The expressive power of XML is also its weakness: without any standardization, I
would have an infinite number of meaningless and unrelated descriptive languages,
defeating our goal of human and machine interoperability. An XML schema gives us
a way to standardize a description, but even this is not sufficiently robust for machine
readability.
Figure A-2: The RDF logo. Its structure suggests the triple pattern. From [3].
Free text Triple pattern(s)
The population of { "Boston", "population", "1E6" }
Boston is one million.
The Red Line stops at { "Red Line", "station", "Park Street" }
Park Street.
The color of the sky is { "Sky", "color", "blue" }
blue.
Table A.1: Expressing natural language as triples.
A.2 RDF
The Resource Description Framework, or RDF, provides an infrastructure for creating
metadata using the ides of the URI [3] [32]. RDF builds on XML technologies to
provide a framework for using XML to describe data.
At its core, RDF is little more than a formalization of the triple pattern:
{ subject predicate object }
The triple pattern is a representation of a (noun,verb,modif ier) sentence con-
struct. These three pieces of information describe relationships between objects.
Indeed, this pattern is very similar to the constructs for description available in many
spoken and written languages. As an example, I show how triple patterns might
represent the following relationships in pseudocode in table A.1.
I can chain triple patterns together to make more complex statements, as I show
in table A.2.
From this information, I could conclude that Zach lives in Illinois2 . This system
of description lends itself to automated reasoning, which is precisely why it is suitable
for Semantic Web activity. I will discuss tools to perform this kind of analysis shortly.
In practice, there are two additional clarifications that allow definition of triple
patterns. First, every subject, predicate, and object must be a URI, a literal, or
..: , __1 __1 -
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Free text Triple pattern(s)
Jane has a pet dog { "Jane", "pet", "Zach" }
named Zach and a
house in Illinois.
{ "Zack", "species", "dog" }
{ "Jane", "residence", "house" }
{ "house", "location", "Illinois" }
Zach lives in the { "Zach", "residence", "house" }
house.
Table A.2: Expressing natural language as triples.
possibly a variable:
<http://example.com/boston> <http: //example. com/population> "1,000,000"
Secondly, RDF triples must be serialized (written) in a standard format. The
two popular approaches for RDF serialization are RDF/XML and Notation 3, or N3
(cite http://www.w3.org/Designlssues/Notation3.html). I can express this example
in RDF/XML as follows, using abbreviations for the RDF and fictitious "geography"
namespaces for convenience. RDF/XML fulfills the need for expression of triple
pattern relationships in a standardized, royalty-free, open format.
<rdf:RDF
xmlns :rdf="http: //www . w3. org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns: geography="http: //example. com/">
<rdf :Description rdf : about="http: //example. com/new-york">
<geography :population>8000000</geography : population>
</rdf : Description>
</rdf : RDF>
In a more general sense, triple patterns enable the expression of nodes and edges
of a (directed) graph. Subjects and objects are nodes in the graph, and predicates
define the edges.
A.2.1 Notation 3
Notation 3, or N3, is able to express all of RDF/XML, with the goal of being more
human readable. For comparison, I show the same triple pattern with an N3 serial-
ization, assuming the same namespaces.
@pref ix geography: <http://example.com/>
geography:boston geography:population 1000000
The N3 serialization, a form of shorthand or "syntactic sugar", is equivalent to the
RDF/XML serialization above; tools exist that will transform one into the other. The
real strength of N3 - in light of the goals of the Semantic Web - is that it is more
human readable.
Notation 3 is more expressive than pure RDF; indeed, the complete RDF 1.0
specification is a subset of N3. The language supports implication and quantifiable
variables ("for all" and "for some"). This additional expressive power enables some
interesting applications, such as reasoners, rule systems, and query processing.
A.3 OWL
RDF and the URI together can describe the properties that an object has, by using
unique names and expressing subject,predicate,object relationships. In order to have
multiple parties agree on a standard set of descriptors for objects, and encode restric-
tions such as "there is exactly one of these" or "this is a subtype of that", another
system is necessary. The Web Ontology Language, or OWL, provides a common way
to capture these design patterns [33].
OWL offers a way to create ontologies that is more expressive than XML or
RDF. Its three dialects, OWL Lite, OWL DL, and OWL Full, offer graded levels of
expressive power. OWL allows URIs to have structure, with cardinality, equivalence,
and subtyping. OWL can connect different ontologies.
A.4 Tabulator
The Tabulator [34] is a Semantic Web browser. Implemented as a browser plug-in,
or possibly as a standalone application, it makes it easier for humans to view and
understand RDF data. Tabulator enables searching, outlining, and tabular display of
semantic data. It supports add-ins that enable micro-blogging, and help users under-
stand the structure of some specific RDF formats. Tabulator's role in the Semantic
Web project is to serve as a crucial bridge to human usability.
A.5 SPARQL
RDF data defines a graph structure. This graph may be more complex than a re-
lational model, which focuses on linked tables of row/column attributes. Thus, for
reasons of performance or simplicity, it may be useful to create a new data structure
for storing triple patterns. For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to assume
that there exists a way to store triple patterns.
Data is meaningless unless it has context and an interested party is able to find it.
The URI and the triple pattern [35] allow data to have context, using standards and
ontologies that many parties may use. The missing piece of the puzzle is SPARQL, a
query language for RDF data and triple stores.
From the SPARQL language specification [4]:
"SPARQL can be used to express queries across diverse data sources,
whether the data is stored natively as RDF or viewed as RDF via middle-
ware. SPARQL contains capabilities for querying required and optional
graph patterns along with their conjunctions and disjunctions. SPARQL
also supports extensible value testing and constraining queries by source
RDF graph. The results of SPARQL queries can be results sets or RDF
graphs."
Given the N3 triples in figure A-3, and the SPARQL query in figure A-4, a
SPARQL query processor might return the output in table A.3. (This example comes
<http://example.org/book/book1> \
<http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/title> "SPARQL Tutorial"
Figure A-3: A sample RDF data set, using backslash to denote newline. From [4].
SELECT ?title
WHERE
<http://example.org/book/book1> \
<http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/title> ?title
}
Figure A-4: A sample SPARQL query. From [4].
from the SPARQL W3C Recommendation [43.)
SPARQL's syntax is reminiscent of SQL, and this is intentional. A SPARQL im-
plementation will find triple patterns that match the triple patterns specified in the
WHERE part of a SPARQL query, and bind and return variables in the SELECT part
of the query. In this case, the SPARQL engine will look for any objects in triple pat-
terns, such that the subject of the triple pattern is "<http: //example. org/book/bookl>"
and the object of the triple pattern is "<http: //purl. org/dc/elements/1. 1/title>".
Given only the data in figure 1, it finds exactly one triple pattern with this subject
and predicate, the triple pattern with the object "SPARQL Tutorial".
The SPARQL language is a robust query language. In short, SPARQL is to RDF
graphs as SQL is to relational databases. The introduction of SPARQL provides
a much needed tool for querying RDF graphs, using a simple, familiar syntax. It
enables joins through multiple match patterns. It allows a user to CONSTRUCT
a new RDF graph based on the results of the query, to FILTER data, to mark a
certain match as OPTIONAL, and to alter the results using LIMIT and OFFSET
directives. A user can ASK if any pattern matches a pattern, or have the SPARQL
engine DESCRIBE its data set. A user can even specify our own RDF graphs for a
Variable Binding
title "SPARQL Tutorial"
Table A.3: The output of a basic SPARQL query.
query using FROM and FROM NAMED; the SPARQL engine may or may not handle
user-specified graphs. (A more thorough discussion of the features of the SPARQL
query language follows in a later section, as part of the discussion of this project's
query translator.)
A.6 Reasoning
The reasoning systems in this project build on some classic principles of logic and
logical programming. A brief overview of those technologies follows.
A.6.1 Forward Chaining
Forward chaining, or modus ponens, is a reasoning method by which a set of rules
are used to draw all possible conclusions about a data set. A rule typically has two
parts, a left hand side and a right hand side, an "if" clause and a "then" clause, a
condition and a consequent. This is also known as a data driven approach, since the
rules used and the outcome will vary depending on the data. Of course, the rules
determine which possible outcomes a forward chaining system may reach.
The inverse of a forward chaining system is backward chaining. In a backward
chaining system, the goal is to find data to support a conclusion. This approach is
also called a goal driven approach.
Indeed, the SPARQL language presented above uses forward reasoning to match
triple patterns. In the case of figure A-4, there must be a rule, somewhere, whose
condition is "if there is a triple pattern with this subject and this predicate", and
whose consequent is "then output that same triple's object". The forward chaining
approach allows arbitrary conclusions given data and rules; given an unlimited data
set, rules could run for a long time, possibly forever.
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A.6.2 Production Rule Systems
A production rule system is a computer program that implements a forward chaining
reasoner with a set of rules over a data set. The production rules also feature a condi-
tion and a consequent. In addition to forming conclusions, the rules in a production
system may have side effects, triggering outside events or causing side effects within
the system.
A "naive" production rule system will simply apply every rule, repeatedly, until
it finds a match. Some optimizations will change the order of the rules, or perhaps
give certain rules priority.
A.6.3 The Rete Algorithm
Rete (pronounced REE-tee) is the name of a particular algorithm used for pattern
matching in production rule systems [36]. Developed in the late 1970s by Charles
Forgy, Rete offers substantial performance improvements to previous production rule
systems by using a tree-based approach. The Rete algorithm makes use of some
moderately advanced graph theory in its implementation. for our purposes, what is
important is that the algorithm scales well.
A.6.4 Semantic Web Application Platform
The Semantic Web Application Platform is the name of a number of technologies
developed for the purpose of furthering Semantic Web research [37]. The platform
is working to create tools and utilities to enable conversion, extraction, and use of
Semantic Web data.
A.6.5 cwm and cwmrete
Cwm is a software suite written to facilitate Semantic Web work [38]. From the Cwm
homepage:
"Cwm (pronounced coom) is a general-purpose data processor for the se-
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mantic web, somewhat like sed, awk, etc. for text files or XSLT for XML.
It is a forward chaining reasoner which can be used for querying, check-
ing, transforming and filtering information. Its core language is RDF,
extended to include rules, and it uses RDF/XML or RDF/N3 serializa-
tions as required."
The cwm reasoner is the backbone of many Semantic Web projects, including this
one. Cwmrete, an implementation of the Rete algorithm in cwm, allows advanced
forward chaining, as required by the AIR language.
A.7 AIR
A.7.1 Introduction
The AIR policy language, for "Accountability in RDF" or "AMORD [39] in RDF,"
is a specification for writing policies and making assertions. The language makes use
of Notation 3 (N3), an RDF syntax, for expressing policies. These policies consist of
individual rules and patterns that, if matched, will trigger other rules and assertions.
AIR implements a system of production rules using forward chaining reasoning.
The current implementation of the AIR reasoner draws on pre-existing technolo-
gies. The reasoner presently incorporates a truth maintenance system (TMS). The
AIR reasoner also incorporates work from the Rein project [14], which specified poli-
cies written in N3, and reasoning using the cwm engine. Rein also introduced dis-
tributed policies, and reasoning over such policies in the Semantic Web.
In its current form, the AIR reasoner consists of several components. Rules files,
written in N3, specify policies, each with at least one rules, which can make assertions.
Log files, also in the N3 format, contain facts upon which I might apply AIR rules.
AIR permits multiple log files. Finally, a reasoner, or "policy runner", accepts a
rule file and one or more log files as input. The reasoner will continue to apply the
rules using either an open-world or a closed-world assumption until there is nothing
more to deduce. For the purpose of this project, the reasoner uses a closed-world
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Figure A-5: Diagram of the AIR policy language ontology.
assumption so that all assertions depend solely on rules and policies I provide. The
reasoner's output, in the N3 format, details the reasoning it performed, including a
nested list of the assertions it made.
The AIR ontology serves to define the AIR language, in showing which classes are
subclasses of other classes and demonstrating how rules inherit from containers and
actions. A diagram of the ontology appears in figure A-5.
A.7.2 A Brief AIR Tutorial
In this section, I demonstrate the features of a relatively simple AIR policy: a slightly
amended version of the policy in the MIT Prox Card Scenario [40]. The sample policy
is complete, and exemplifies many of the features of the AIR language. The online
AIR policy tutorial is a helpful reference here [41]. The full text of this example policy
is in the appendix. The main body of this paper will contain some more advanced
policies.
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It bears mentioning that the policies discussed herein are in "version 1" of the AIR
language. All of the policies presented later are in "version 1" as well. An updated
syntax, "version 2", is current and was introduced on 13 April 2009. I will quickly
demonstrate the differences in versions and rationale for the change here, and discuss
the need to move to the new version in the Future Work section.
First, any AIR file should declare the air namespace, as AIR policies rely upon
the ontology that this namespace defines. The trailing dot is mandatory.
Opref ix air: <http://dig.csail.mit. edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>
An individual policy may declare any namespace as its local namespace, and also
specify any number of additional namespaces.
@prefix : <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/sO/mit-policy#>
(additional namespaces)
The policy file must declare the variables it will use using an @forAll or o@for-
Some declaration toward the beginning. This is mandatory, as the AIR file has N3
semantics!
forAll :U, :D, :P1.
An AIR policy file may contain multiple policies; our example only contains policy.
I recall that N3 has some reserved keywords, such as a and is a, which refer to
concepts in the OWL ontology. For example, a is shorthand for owl: sameAs. (cite
http: //www. w3. org/TR/owl-ref /#sameAs-def) A policy may call one or more rules
in an attempt to forward chain and make an assertion.
:MITProxCardPolicy a air:Policy;
air:rule :MITRulel.
Note that this is equivalent to:
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/sO/mit-policy#:MITProxCardPolicy \
owl:sameAs http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#:Policy;
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/sO/mit-policy#:MITProxCardPolicy \
air:rule http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/sO/mit-policy#:MITRule1.
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A policy will point to one or more rules. A rule can contain:
" a description, which is a free text descriptor of the rule and may contain variable
references;
" a pattern, which is a set of conditions that must all be true for a rule to activate;
" a label, which is a name for the rule;
" an assert, which is the action the reasoner takes if the pattern is matched;
" an alt, which is the action the reasoner will take if the pattern is not matched.
The first rule merits further investigation:
:MITRule1 a air:BeliefRule;
air:label "MIT prox-card policy";
air:pattern {
:U a air:UseEvent;
air:data :D;
air:purpose :P1.
:D a mit:ProxCardEvent.
air:rule :MITRule2.
This code captures the following meaning: "Suppose I can find something, call it
:U, that is an air:UseEvent, with an air:Data of something else that I can call :D,
and an air:purpose of yet another thing that I can call :P1. If that :D turns out to
be an mit: ProxCardEvent, then activate :MITRule2."
Let's take a look at the following two rules.
:MITRule2 a air:BeliefRule;
air:pattern { :P1 :sameAs pur:criminal-law-enforcement. };
air:description (:P1 " is same as a criminal activity");
air:assert { :U air:compliant-with :MITProxCardPolicy. };
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air:alt [ air:rule :MITRule3 1.
:MITRule3 a air:BeliefRule;
air:pattern {};
air:description (:P1 " is different from a criminal activity");
air:assert { :U air:non-compliant-with :MITProxCardPolicy }.
This pair of rules says, "If that purpose :P1 I found is, in fact, the same as
pur: criminal-law-enforcement, then this :U is compliant. Otherwise, this :U is
not compliant!"
The MIT Prox Card Policy, though relatively simple, serves to encode a real-world
policy in an electronic format that a machine can readily use. There is some effort to
further this work, to encode more real world laws and policies; it is the focus of TAMI,
the Transparent Accountable Datamining Initiative (cite tami), and other works (cite
any that you find).
A.7.3 Changes to the AIR language
On 15 April 2009, Ian Jacobi announced the following changes to the AIR language
specification, bringing it to version 2. As all of the policies in this thesis use version
1 of the AIR language specification, porting them to version 2 is an important future
work. The changes are as follows.
1. The air: pattern and air: alt properties have been effectively renamed to
air:if and -air:else-. So:
[ air:pattern :A
air:alt :B ]
Would become:
[ air:if :A ;
air:else :B ]
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2. The air: assert property now behaves like the air: assertion property, while
air: assertion (and the old functionality of air: assert) is no longer sup-
ported. Thus:
[ air:assert :A
air:assertion :B ]
Would become:
[ air:assert [ air:statement :A ]
air:assert :B I .
3. The air: rule and air: assert properties are no longer permitted to accept
air:Abstract-rule as a subject. They now take air:Abstract-action (like
the bnode object of the old air: alt). To allow for the old actions, a new
property has been added, air: then, that behaves like air: alt, except that
the actions trigger on match. An air: Abstract-action may have only one of
air:rule, air:goal-rule, air:assert, air:assert-goal.
In summary, then:
[ air:pattern :A
air:rule :B ;
air:goal-rule :C
air:assert :D ;
air:assert-goal :E
air:assertion :F
air:alt :AnAlt I
:AnAlt [ air:rule :G
air:assert :H ]
Would now become:
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[ air:if :A ;
air:then [ air:rule :B I
[ air:goal-rule :C I
[ air:assert [ air:statement :D ] ]
[ air:assert-goal [ air:statement :E ]
[ air:assert :F I ;
# Note that the air:alt no longer can hold both air:rule :G
# and air:assert :H.
# They must be added as objects of separate air:else statements now.
air:else [ air:rule :G I ,
[ air:assert [ air:statement :H ] I
A.7.4 AIR Summary
The AIR language allows a user to write arbitrary policies, to draw arbitrary con-
clusions. It is a flexible, relatively easy to use and understand language. It draws
upon some technologies that are decades old to perform its reasoning. It provides an
interesting application of Semantic Web technologies and is a crucial cornerstone of
this project.
A.8 Summary
The ongoing Semantic Web initiative has grown to include a number of technologies,
such as RDF and SPARQL, for describing and manipulating data. This project makes
use of a number of technologies, most importantly SPARQL and AIR. All of these
technologies are fields of active research, and as such, subject to change in the future.
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Appendix B
Supporting Code
B.1 MIT Prox Card Policy
1 # MIT Prox Card Policy: http://web.mit.edu/mitcard/privacy.html
2 # We use a simplified policy: prox card data can only be used for
3 # criminal investigation.
4
5 #### Namespaces ####
6
7 # The default namespace is this document.
8 @prefix : <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/sO/mit-policy#>
9
10 # "prox:" is an alias for ":" to improve printed output.
11 @prefix prox: <#>
12
13 # AIR (AMORD in RDF) is the policy language.
14 Oprefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>
15
16 # Purposes are drawn from a predefined set.
17 @prefix pur: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2006/s4/purposes#>
18
19 # The "mit:" namespace defines background terms specific to MIT.
20 @prefix mit: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/s0/university#>
21
22 @prefix owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#>.
23
24 #### Policy ####
25
26 @forAll :U, :D, :P1.
27
28 :MITProxCardPolicy a air:Policy;
29 air:rule :MITRule1.
30
31 :MITRule1 a air:BeliefRule;
32 air:label "MIT prox-card policy";
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33 air:pattern {
34 :U a air:UseEvent;
35 air:data :D;
36 air:purpose :P1.
37 :D a mit:ProxCardEvent.
38 ;
39 air:rule :MITRule2.
40
41 :MITRule2 a air:BeliefRule;
42 air:pattern { :P1 :sameAs pur:criminal-law-enforcement. };
43 air:description (:P1 " is same as a criminal activity");
44 air:assert { :U air:compliant-with :MITProxCardPolicy. };
45 air:alt [ air:rule :MITRule3 ]
46
47 :MITRule3 a air:BeliefRule;
48 air:pattern {};
49 air:description (:P1 " is different from a criminal activity");
50 air:assert { :U air:non-compliant-with :MITProxCardPolicy }.
51
52 #ends
B.2 SSN Policy - Original Ontology
1 # $Date: 2009-04-13 18:57:50 -0400 (Mon, 13 Apr 2009) $
2 # $Revision: 25833 $
3 # $Author: jsoltren $
4
5 # SSN Policy: No-one can access SSN information from the database
6 # specifically, you cannot query for someone's SSN number
7 # or use it in the filter clause
8
9 @prefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>
10 @prefix owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#>.
11 @prefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
12 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
13 @prefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>.
14 @prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
15 @prefix : <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/ssn-policy#>
16
17 @forAll :Q, :P, :W, :V, :T, :F, :S.
18 oforAll :X, :Y, :Z, :A, :B, :0.
19
20 :SSNPolicy a air:Policy;
21 air:label "SSN sample policy for IARPA PIR project";
22 air:rule :SSNRULE1.
23
24 :SSNRULE1 a air:BeliefRule;
25 air:label "SSN policy rulel";
26 air:pattern {
27 :Q a s:Select;
28 s:POSList :P;
29 s:WhereClause :W.
30
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31 air:description (:Q " is a SPARQL query");
32 air:rule :SSNRULE2.
33
34 :SSNRULE2 a air:BeliefRule;
35 air:label "SSN policy rule2";
36 air:pattern {
37 :P s:variable :V.
38 :W s:TriplePattern :T.
39 :T log:includes { :X <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> :V
40 :W s:Filter :F.
41 :F s:TriplePattern :S.
42 :S log:includes { :V [] [1 }.
43
44 #air:description ("The query, " :Q ", uses SSN values in the
where clause as a pattern, " :T ", and as a filter, " :S ",
and retrieves SSN values as variable," :V );
45 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", uses SSN values in the
where clause, as a filter and retrieves SSN values as well");
46 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSNPolicy };
47 air:alt [ air:rule :SSNRULE3 ].
48
49 :SSNRULE3 a air:BeliefRule;
50 air:label "SSN policy rule3";
51 air:pattern {
52 :P s:variable :V.
53 :W s:TriplePattern :T.
54 :T log:includes { :X <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> :V
}
55
56 #air:description ("The query, " :Q ", uses SSN values in the
where clause as a pattern, " :T ", and retrieves SSN values
as variable," :V );
57 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", uses SSN values in the
where clause and retrieves SSN values");
58 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSNPolicy };
59 air:alt [ air:rule :SSNRULE5 ].
60
61 :SSNRULE4 a air:BeliefRule;
62 air:label "SSN policy rule4";
63 air:pattern {
64 :P s:variable :V.
65 :W s:TriplePattern :T.
66 :T log:includes { :X <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> :Y
}
67
68 #air:description ("The query, " :Q ", includes reference to
SSN number in the where clause as a pattern," :T );
69 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", includes reference to
SSN number in the where clause");
70 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSNPolicy };
71 air:alt [ air:rule :SSNRULE7 1.
72
73 :SSNRULE5 a air:BeliefRule;
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74 air:label "SSN policy rule5";
75 air:pattern {
76 :W s:OptionalGraphPattern :0.
77 :0 s:TriplePattern :T.
78 :T log:includes { [] <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> []
}
79
80 #air:description ("The query, " :Q ", includes reference to
SSN number in the optional part of the where clause as a
pattern," :T );
81 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", includes reference to
SSN number in the optional part of the where clause");
82 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSNPolicy };
83 air:alt [ air:rule :SSNRULE4 ].
84
85 :SSNRULE6 a air:BeliefRule;
86 air:label "SSN policy rule6";
87 air:pattern {
88 :W s:TriplePattern :T.
89 :T log:notIncludes { [] <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn>
[] }
90
91 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", does not includes
reference to SSN number in the where clause");
92 #air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :SSNPolicy }.
93 air:rule :SSNRULE7.
94
95 :SSNRULE7 a air:BeliefRule;
96 air:label "SSN policy rule7";
97 air:pattern {
98 :W s:OptionalGraphPattern :0.
99 };
100 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", has an optional part")
101 air:rule :SSNRULE8;
102 air:alt :SSNRULE9.
103
104 :SSNRULE9 a air:BeliefRule;
105 air:pattern {};
106 air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :SSNPolicy };
107 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", does not have a
reference to SSN number in its optional section as it does
not have an optional section").
108
109
110 :SSNRULE8 a air:BeliefRule;
111 air:label "SSN policy rule8";
112 air:pattern {
113 :0 s:TriplePattern :A.
114 :A log:notIncludes { [] <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn>
[1 }
115
116 }:
112
117 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", does not includes
reference to SSN number in the optional section of the
where clases");
118 air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :SSNPolicy }.
119
120
121
122
123 :SSNPolicyWhereClause a air:Policy;
124 air:label "SSN where clause policy for IARPA PIR project";
125 air:rule :SSNWC01.
126
127 :SSNWC01 a air:BeliefRule;
128 air:label "SSN where clause rule 01";
129 air:pattern {
130 :Q a s:Select;
131 s:POSList :P;
132 s:WhereClause :W.
133 };
134 air:description (:Q " is a SPARQL query");
135 air:rule :SSNWC02.
136
137 :SSNWCO2 a air:BeliefRule;
138 air:label "SSN where clause rule 02";
139 air:pattern {
140 :P s:variable :V.
141 :W s:TriplePattern :T.
142 :T log:includes { :X <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> :Y
}
143
144 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", includes reference to
SSN number in the where clause");
145 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with
SSNPolicyWhereClause }.
146
147
148 :SSNPolicyOptionalClause a air:Policy;
149 air:label "SSN optional clause policy for IARPA PIR project";
150 air:rule :SSNOP01.
151
152 :SSNOP01 a air:BeliefRule;
153 air:label "SSN optional clause rule 01";
154 air:pattern {
155 :Q a s:Select;
156 s:POSList :P;
157 s:WhereClause :W.
158 };
159 air:description (:Q " is a SPARQL query");
160 air:rule :SSN_0P02.
161
162 :SSN_0P02 a air:BeliefRule;
163 air:label "SSN optional clause rule 02";
164 air:pattern {
165 :W s:OptionalGraphPattern :0.
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166 :0 s:TriplePattern :T.
167 :T log:includes { [] <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> []
}
168
169 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", includes reference to
SSN number in the optional part of the where clause");
170 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with
SSNPolicyOptionalClause }.
171
172
173 :SSNPolicyOutputRule a air:Policy;
174 air:label "SSN output rule policy for IARPA PIR project";
175 air:rule :SSNOR01.
176
177 :SSNOR01 a air:BeliefRule;
178 air:label "SSN output rule 01";
179 air:pattern {
180 :Q a s:Select;
181 s:POSList :P;
182 s:WhereClause :W.
183 ;
184 air:description (:Q " is a SPARQL query");
185 air:rule :SSN_0R02.
186
187 :SSN_0R02 a air:BeliefRule;
188 air:label "SSN output rule 02";
189 air:pattern {
190 :P s:variable :V.
191 :W s:TriplePattern :T.
192 :T log:includes { [1 <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> :V
193
194 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", tries to output a
variable " :P " that is an SSN");
195 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSNPolicyOutputRule
196
197
198
199 :SSNPolicyFilterRule a air:Policy;
200 air:label "SSN filter rule policy for IARPA PIR project";
201 air:rule :SSNFRO1.
202
203 :SSNFRO1 a air:BeliefRule;
204 air:label "SSN filter rule 01";
205 air:pattern {
206 :Q a s:Select;
207 s:POSList :P;
208 s:WhereClause :W.
209 ;
210 air:description (:Q " is a SPARQL query");
211 air:rule :SSNFRO2.
212
213 :SSNFR02 a air:BeliefRule;
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214 air:label "SSN filter rule 02";
215 air:pattern {
216 :P s:variable :V.
217 :W s:TriplePattern :T.
218 :T log:includes { :X <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ssn> :V
}.
219 :W s:Filter :F.
220 :F s:TriplePattern :S.
221 :S log:includes { :V [] [] }.
222
223 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", filters on SSN
variables");
224 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSNPolicyFilterRule
225
226 #ends
B.3 SSN Policy - Current Ontology
1 # SSN Policy: No one can access SSN information from the database.
2 # As a result, no one may USE or RETRIEVE data tagged as SSN data.
3 # We include two separate policies: one for usage, and one for
retrieval.
4
5 Oprefix type: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/generic#>
6 Oprefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>
7 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
8 Oprefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
9 @prefix : <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/ssn-policy#>
10
11 @forAll :P, :Q, :T, :U, :V, :W.
12
13 # The USE policy.
14
15 :SSN-USE-Policy a air:Policy;
16 air:label "SSN USE policy. For IARPA PIR project.";
17 air:rule :SSNUSERULE1.
18
19 :SSNUSERULE1 a air:BeliefRule;
20 air:label "SSN USE policy rule 1. Checks for query.";
21 air:pattern {
22 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
23 # s:retrieve :P; - a query doesn't need to output
anything in order
24 # to USE something!
25 s:clause :W.
26
27 air:description (:Q " is a query.");
28 air:rule :SSNUSERULE2.
29
30 :SSNUSERULE2 a air:BeliefRule;
31 air:label "SSN USE policy rule 2. Checks for use, i.e.
filtering.";
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32 air:pattern {
33 # :P s:var :V. - we don't need to bind to an output
variable
34 # in order to USE an SSN.
35 :W s:triplePattern :T.
36 :T log:includes { [1 type:SSN :V }.
37 :W s:triplePattern :U.
38 :U log:includes { :V [] [] }.
39
40 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", includes a USE of an
SSN in the pattern " :U ". The policy states that queries
may not USE social security number data.");
41 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSN-USE-Policy };
42 air:alt [ air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :SSN-USE-Policy
} 1.
43
44
45 # The RETRIEVE policy.
46
47 :SSN-RETRIEVE-Policy a air:Policy;
48 air:label "SSN RETRIEVE policy. For IARPA PIR project";
49 air:rule :SSNRETRIEVERULE1.
50
51 :SSNRETRIEVERULE1 a air:BeliefRule;
52 air:label "SSN RETRIEVE policy rule 1. Checks for query.";
53 air:pattern {
54 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
55 s:retrieve :P;
56 s:clause :W.
57 };
58 air:description (:Q " is a query.");
59 air:rule :SSNRETRIEVERULE2.
60
61 :SSNRETRIEVERULE2 a air:BeliefRule;
62 air:label "SSN RETRIEVE policy rule 2. Checks for retrieval,
i.e. output.";
63 air:pattern {
64 :P s:var :V.
65 :W s:triplePattern :T.
66 :T log:includes { [1 type:SSN :V
67
68 air:description ("The query, " :Q ", will RETRIEVE SSN data
in the pattern " :T ". The policy states that queries may
not RETRIEVE social security number data.");
69 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :SSN-RETRIEVE-Policy
};
70 air:alt [ air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :SSN-RETRIEVE-
Policy } ]
71
72
73 #ends
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B.4 A sample SPARQL Query
1 PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
2 PREFIX foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>
3 SELECT ?s ?id ?n WHERE {
4 ?s foaf:ssn ?n.
5 ?s foaf:age ?a.
6 ?s foaf:openid ?id.
7 FILTER (?a > 18)
8 }
B.5 Abstract SPARQL to N3 Ontology
1 # $Date: 2009-07-27 13:04:49 -0400 (Mon, 27 Jul 2009) $
2 # $Revision: 26843 $
3 # $Author: yyyaron $
4
5 Oprefix rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#>
6 Oprefix rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
7 Oprefix xsd: <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#>
8
9 @prefix : <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
10
11 # abstract ontology to express subset of SPARQL queries
12
13 <> rdfs:comment "abstract ontology to express subset of SPARQL
queries".
14
15 #example sparql query
16 #PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#>
17 #PREFIX foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>
18 #PREFIX example: <http://example.org/>
19 #SELECT * WHERE {
20 # ?s example:age ?a.
21 # ?s foaf:openid ?id.
22 # OPTIONAL { ?s example:ssn ?n }.
23 # FILTER ( ?a > 18 )
24 #}
25 # translated to
26 #@prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/abstract-sparql
27 #
28 #:Query-1052391960 a s:SPARQLQuery;
29 # s:retrieve [ s:var :id; s:var :n; s:var :s; s:var :a ];
30 # s:clause [
31 # s:triplePattern { :s <http://example.org/age> :a
32 # s:triplePattern { :s <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/openid> :id
};
33 # s:triplePattern { :s <http://example.org/ssn> :n };
34 # s:triplePattern { :a s:booleanGT "18 "}
35 # ].
36
37 :SPARQLQuery a rdfs:Class;
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38 rdfs:label "Abstract class of SPARQL queries.".
39
40 :source a rdf:Property;
41 rdfs:label "URIs from which a query may pull data.";
42 rdfs:domain :SPARQLQuery;
43
44 :retrieve a rdf:Property;
45 rdfs:label "Values retrieved by a query.";
46 rdfs:domain :SPARQLQuery;
47 rdfs:range :RetrievedVar.
48
49 :RetrievedVar a rdfs:Class;
50 rdfs:label "Class consisting of retrieved variables.".
51
52 :var a rdf:Property;
53 rdfs:label "Values retrieved by a query.";
54 rdfs:domain :RetrievedVar.
55
56 :clause a rdf:Property;
57 rdfs:label "Conditions or where clause associated with the query
.If .
58 rdfs:domain :SPARQLQuery;
59 rdf:range :Clause.
60
61 :Clause a rdfs:Class;
62 rdfs:label "Class consisting of triple patterns.".
63
64 :triplePattern a rdf:Property;
65 rdfs:label "A triple pattern for each condition/where.";
66 rdfs:domain :Clause.
67
68 # These are arithmetic and Boolean operators that the translation
recognizes.
69
70 rdf:resourceNegation a rdf:Property;
71 rdfs:label "Negative of a number, -. ";
72 rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
73
74 rdf:resourceInverse a rdf:Property;
75 rdfs:label "Inverse of a number, /.";
76 rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
77
78 rdf:resourceSum a rdf:Property;
79 rdfs:label "Sum of two numbers, +.";
80 rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
81
82 rdf:resourceProduct a rdf:Property;
83 rdfs:label "Multiplication of two numbers, *."
84 rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
85
86 :booleanNOT a rdf:Property;
87 rdfs:label "The Boolean NOT operator, ! or ."
88 rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
89
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:booleanAND a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "The Boolean AND operator, &&.";
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
||I.";'
:booleanNE a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "A not equal to relationship,
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
!= . ;
:booleanLT a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "A less than relationship,
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
:booleanGT a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "A greater than
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
:booleanLE a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "A less than or
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
:booleanGE a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "A greater than
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
relationship,
equal to relationship, <=.";
or equal to relationship, >=
#ends
B.6 Sample Restriction Policy
1 # Auto-generated AIR restriction policy.
2
3 Oprefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>.
4 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
5 @prefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
6 Oprefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>.
7 @prefix :<>.
8
9 # User-defined namespaces:
0 @prefix example: <http://www.example.com/#>
1
2 OforAll :P, :Q, :T, :U, :V, :W.
3
4 :sample-restriction a air:Policy;
5 air:label "A sample auto-generated restriction policy.";
6 air:rule :sample-restriction-check.
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:booleanOR a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "The Boolean OR operator,
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
:booleanEQ a rdf:Property;
rdfs:label "An equal to relationship,
rdfs:domain rdf:resource.
<."It;
> ."it;
18 :sample-restriction-check a air:BeliefRule;
19 air:label "sample-restriction query check";
20 air:pattern {
21 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
22 s:retrieve :P;
23 s:clause :W.
24 };
25 air:description ("Make sure this is a query.");
26 # Goes to the first rule. If there are no attributes,
27 # simply go to the default rule.
28 air:rule :sample-restriction-rule-0.
29
30 :sample-restriction-rule-0 a air:BeliefRule;
31 air:label "sample-restriction example:name restriction";
32 air:pattern {
33 # if RETRIEVE, or alternately, not USE
34 :P s:var :V;
35 :W s:triplePattern :T;
36 :T log:includes { [] example:name :V }
37 };
38 air:description ("A restriction on the RETRIEVE of example:name,
violated by " :T );
39 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-restriction)};
40 # There are more policies, go to the next policy.
41 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-restriction-rule-1 ]
42
43 :sample-restriction-rule-1 a air:BeliefRule;
44 air:label "sample-restriction example:age restriction";
45 air:pattern {
46 # if USE
47 :W s:triplePattern :T;
48 :T log:includes { [] example:age :V };
49 :W s:triplePattern :U;
50 :U log:includes { :V [] [] }.
51 };
52 air:description ("A restriction on the USE of example:age,
violated by " :T );
53 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-restriction)};
54 # There are more policies, go to the next policy.
55 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-restriction-rule-2 ]
56
57 :sample-restriction-rule-2 a air:BeliefRule;
58 air:label "sample-restriction example:dob restriction";
59 air:pattern {
60 # if RETRIEVE, or alternately, not USE
61 :P s:var :V;
62 :W s:triplePattern :T;
63 :T log:includes { [1 example:dob :V }
64 };
65 air:description ("A restriction on the RETRIEVE of example:dob,
violated by " :T );
66 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-restriction)};
67 # There are more policies, go to the next policy.
68 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-restriction-rule-3 I .
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69
70 :sample-restriction-rule-3 a air:BeliefRule;
71 air:label "sample-restriction example:ssn restriction";
72 air:pattern {
73 # if USE
74 :W s:triplePattern :T;
75 :T log:includes { [] example:ssn :V };
76 :W s:triplePattern :U;
77 :U log:includes { :V [] [] }.
78 };
79 air:description ("A restriction on the USE of example:ssn,
violated by " :T );
80 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-restriction)};
81 # No more policies, go to the base case.
82 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-restriction-default ]
83
84 :sample-restriction-default a air:BeliefRule;
85 air:label "sample-restriction default rule";
86 air:pattern { # Empty search.
87 };
88 air:description ("No restricted attributes found.");
89 air:assert{ :Q air:compliant-with :sample-restriction }
90
91 #ends
B.7 Sample Inclusion Policy
1 # Auto-generated AIR inclusion policy.
2
3 @prefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>.
4 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
5 @prefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
6 @prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>.
7 @prefix : <>.
8
9 # User-defined namespaces:
10 @prefix example: <http://www.example.com/#>
11
12 @forAll :P, :Q, :T, :U, :V, :W.
13 OforAll :TO, :UO, :VO. # Variables for example:name
14 @forAll :T1, :U1, :V1. # Variables for example:age
15 QforAll :T2, :U2, :V2. # Variables for example:dob
16 @forAll :T3, :U3, :V3. # Variables for example:ssn
17
18 :sample-inclusion a air:Policy;
19 air:label "A sample auto-generated inclusion policy.";
20 air:rule :sample-inclusion-check.
21
22 :sample-inclusion-check a air:BeliefRule;
23 air:label "sample-inclusion query check";
24 air:pattern {
25 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
26 s:retrieve :P;
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27 s:clause :W.
28 ;
29 air:description ("Make sure this is a query.");
30 # Goes to the first rule. If there are no attributes,
31 # simply go to the default rule.
32 air:rule :sample-inclusion-compliance-rule.
33
34 :sample-inclusion-compliance-rule a air:BeliefRule;
35 air:label "sample-inclusion, an inclusion policy.";
36 air:pattern {
# Catch RETRIEVE
:P s:var :VO.
:W s:triplePattern
:TO log:includes {
# Catch USE
:W s:triplePattern
:T1 log:includes {
:W s:triplePattern
:U1 log:includes {
# Catch RETRIEVE
:P s:var :V2.
:W s:triplePattern
:T2 log:includes {
# Catch USE
:W s:triplePattern
:T3 log:includes {
:W s:triplePattern
:U3 log:includes {
I ;
air:description ("This
TO.
[] example:name :VO }
:T1.
[] example:age :V1 }.
:U1.
:V1 [1 [] }
:T2.
[] example:dob :V2 }
:T3.
[] example:ssn :V3 }.
:U3.
:V3 [] [] }
inclusion policy states that you must do
all four of these actions: RETRIEVE example:name, USE example
:age, RETRIEVE example:dob, USE example:ssn. This query is
compliant: " :Q ) ;
57 air:assert{ :Q air:compliant-with :sample-inclusion }
58 # All or none. If we don't match all, start looking for
individuals.
59 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-inclusion-rule-0 ]
60
61 :sample-inclusion-rule-0 a air:BeliefRule;
62 air:label "sample-inclusion example:name usage check";
63 air:pattern {
64 # if RETRIEVE, or alternately, not USE
65 :P s:var :V;
66 :W s:triplePattern :T;
67 :T log:includes { [1 example:name :V }
68 };
69 air:description ("Inclusion includes RETRIEVE of example:name,
violated by " :T );
70 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-inclusion)};
71 # There are more attributes, go to the next policy.
72 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-inclusion-rule-1 ]
73
74 :sample-inclusion-rule-1 a air:BeliefRule;
75 air:label "sample-inclusion example:age usage check";
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76 air:pattern {
77 # if USE
78 :W s:triplePattern :T;
79 :T log:includes { [] example:age :V };
80 :W s:triplePattern :U;
81 :U log:includes { :V [] [] }.
82 ;
83 air:description ("Inclusion includes USE of example:age,
violated by " :T );
84 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-inclusion)};
85 # There are more attributes, go to the next policy.
86 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-inclusion-rule-2 ]
87
88 :sample-inclusion-rule-2 a air:BeliefRule;
89 air:label "sample-inclusion example:dob usage check";
90 air:pattern {
91 # if RETRIEVE, or alternately, not USE
92 :P s:var :V;
93 :W s:triplePattern :T;
94 :T log:includes { [] example:dob :V }
95 ;
96 air:description ("Inclusion includes RETRIEVE of example:dob,
violated by " :T );
97 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-inclusion)};
98 # There are more attributes, go to the next policy.
99 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-inclusion-rule-3 ]
100
101 :sample-inclusion-rule-3 a air:BeliefRule;
102 air:label "sample-inclusion example:ssn usage check";
103 air:pattern {
104 # if USE
105 :W s:triplePattern :T;
106 :T log:includes { [] example:ssn :V };
107 :W s:triplePattern :U;
108 :U log:includes { :V [] [] }.
109 ;
110 air:description ("Inclusion includes USE of example:ssn,
violated by " :T );
111 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-inclusion)};
112 # No more attributes, go to the base case.
113 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-inclusion-default ]
114
115
116 :sample-inclusion-default a air:BeliefRule;
117 air:label "sample-inclusion default rule";
118 air:pattern { # Empty search.
119 ;
120 air:description ("This inclusion policy states that you must do
all four of these actions: RETRIEVE example:name, USE example
:age, RETRIEVE example:dob, USE example:ssn. No regulated
attributes found. Asserting compliance.");
121 air:assert{ :Q air:compliant-with :sample-inclusion }
122
123 #ends
123
B.8 Sample Exclusion Policy
1 # Auto-generated AIR exclusion policy.
2
3 Oprefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>.
4 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
5 @prefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
6 @prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>.
7 @prefix :<>.
8
9 # User-defined namespaces:
10 @prefix example: <http://www.example.com/#>
11
12 @forAll :P, :Q, :T, :U, :V, :W.
13 @forAll :TO, :UO, :VO. # Variables for example:name
14 @forAll :T1, :U1, :V1. # Variables for example:age
15 @forAll :T2, :U2, :V2. # Variables for example:dob
16 @forAll :T3, :U3, :V3. # Variables for example:ssn
17
18 :sample-exclusion a air:Policy;
19 air:label "A sample auto-generated exclusion policy.";
20 air:rule :sample-exclusion-check.
21
22 :sample-exclusion-check a air:BeliefRule;
23 air:label "sample-exclusion query check";
24 air:pattern {
25 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
26 s:retrieve :P;
27 s:clause :W.
28 };
29 air:description ("Make sure this is a query.");
30 # Goes to the first rule. If there are no attributes,
31 # simply go to the default rule.
32 air:rule :sample-exclusion-noncompliance-rule.
33
34 :sample-exclusion-noncompliance-rule a air:BeliefRule;
35 air:label "sample-exclusion, a default deny policy.";
36 air:pattern {
37 # Catch RETRIEVE
38 :P s:var :VO.
39 :W s:triplePattern :TO.
40 :TO log:includes { [] example:name :VO }
41 # Catch USE
42 :W s:triplePattern :T1.
43 :T1 log:includes { [] example:age :V1 }.
44 :W s:triplePattern :U1.
45 :U1 log:includes { :V1 [] [] }
46 # Catch RETRIEVE
47 :P s:var :V2.
48 :W s:triplePattern :T2.
49 :T2 log:includes { [] example:dob :V2 }
50 # Catch USE
51 :W s:triplePattern :T3.
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52 :T3 log:includes { [1 example:ssn :V3 }.
53 :W s:triplePattern :U3.
54 :U3 log:includes { :V3 [] [1 }
55 };
56 air:description ("You may see up to 3 of 4 of these attributes:
example:name example:age example:dob example:ssn . This query
is incompliant: " :Q ) ;
57 air:assert{ :Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-exclusion }
58 # No more policies, go to the base case.
59 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-exclusion-default ]
60
61
62 :sample-exclusion-default a air:BeliefRule;
63 air:label "sample-exclusion default rule";
64 air:pattern { # Empty search.
65 };
66 air:description ("No regulated attributes found. Asserting
compliance.");
67 air:assert{ :Q air:compliant-with :sample-exclusion }
68
69 #ends
B.9 Sample History-Aware Exclusion Policy
1 # Auto-generated AIR exclusion policy, history aware.
2
3 @prefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>
4 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#> .
5 @prefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>
6 @prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>
7 @prefix :<>
8
9 # User-defined namespaces:
10 Oprefix example: <http://www.example.com/#>
11
12 @forAll :CURRENT, :H, :HISTORY.
13 QforAll :PO, :QO, :TO, :UO, :VO, :WO. # Variables for example:name
14 QforAll :P1, :Q1, :T1, :U1, :V1, :W1. # Variables for example:age
15 (forAll :P2, :Q2, :T2, :U2, :V2, :W2. # Variables for example:dob
16 oforAll :P3, :Q3, :T3, :U3, :V3, :W3. # Variables for example:ssn
17
18 :sample-exclusion-history a air:Policy;
19 air:label "A sample auto-generated history aware exclusion
policy.";
20 air:rule :sample-exclusion-history-check.
21
22 :sample-exclusion-history-check a air:BeliefRule;
23 air:label "sample-exclusion-history query check";
24 air:pattern {
25 :CURRENT a s:ComplianceQuery;
26 s:Query :Q;
27 s:History :HISTORY.
28 }:
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29 air:description ("Make sure this is a query.");
30 # Goes to the first rule. If there are no attributes
31 # simply go to the default rule.
32 air:rule :sample-exclusion-history-noncompliance-rule.
33
34 :sample-exclusion-history-noncompliance-rule a air:BeliefRule;
35 air:label "sample-exclusion-history, a default deny policy.";
36 air:pattern {
37 :HISTORY log:semantics :H
38 # Catch RETRIEVE of example:name
39 :H log:includes {
40 :00 a s:SPARQLQuery;
41 s:retrieve :PO;
42 s:clause :WO.
43 :PO s:var :VO.
44 :WO s:triplePattern :TO.
45 :TO log:includes { [I example:name :VO}
46 # Catch USE of example:age
47 :H log:includes {
48 :Q1 a s:SPARQLGuery;
49 s:retrieve :P1;
50 s:clause :W1.
51 :W1 s:triplePattern :T1.
52 :W1 s:triplePattern :U1.
53 :U1 log:includes :V1 [I [I
54 :T1 log:includes {[I example:age :V1 }
55 # Catch RETRIEVE of example:dob
56 :H log:includes f
57 Q2 a s:SPARQLQuery;
58 s:retrieve :P2;
59 s:clause :W2.
60 :P2 s:var :V2.
61 :W2 s:triplePattern :T2.
62 :T2 log:includes f [1 example:dob :V2}
63 # Catch USE of example:ssn
64 :H log:includes {
65 :Q3 a s:SPARQLQuery;
66 s:retrieve :P3;
67 s:clause :W3.
68 :W3 s:triplePattern :T3.
72
73 air:description ("You may see up to 3 of 4 of these attributes:
example:name example:age example:dob example:ssn The query
history finds that this new query is incompliant: :Q );
74 air:assert{ :Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-exclusion-history
75 # No more policies, go to the base case.
76 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-exclusion-history-default
77
78
79 :sample-exclusion-history-default a air:BeliefRule;
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80 air:label "sample-exclusion-history default rule";
81 air:pattern { # Empty search.
82 };
83 air:description ("No regulated attributes found by this history-
aware exclusion policy. Asserting compliance by default.");
84 air:assert{ :Q air:compliant-with :sample-exclusion-history }
85
86 #ends
B.10 Sample Chaining Policy
1 # Auto-generated AIR chaining policy.
2 # Policy is default non-compliant. Patterns assert compliance.
3
4 @prefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>.
5 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
6 Oprefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
7 Oprefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>.
8 Oprefix : <>.
9
10 # User-defined namespaces:
11 Oprefix example: <http://www.example.com/#>
12
13 OforAll :P, :Q, :T, :U, :V, :W.
14
15 :sample-chaining a air:Policy;
16 air:label "A sample auto-generated default-noncompliant chaining
policy.";
17 air:rule :sample-chaining-check.
18
19 :sample-chaining-check a air:BeliefRule;
20 air:label "sample-chaining query check";
21 air:pattern {
22 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
23 s:retrieve :P;
24 s:clause :W.
25 };
26 air:description ("Make sure this is a query.");
27 # Goes to the first rule. If there are no attributes,
28 # simply go to the default rule.
29 air:rule :sample-chaining-rule-0.
30
31 :sample-chaining-rule-0 a air:BeliefRule;
32 air:label "sample-chaining example:name presence check";
33 air:pattern {
34 # if RETRIEVE, or alternately, not USE
35 :P s:var :V;
36 :W s:triplePattern :T;
37 :T log:includes { [] example:name :V }
38 };
39 air:description ("Chaining has found the first pattern RETRIEVE
in " :T );
40 air:rule :sample-chaining-rule-1;
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41 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-chaining-default ]
42
43 :sample-chaining-rule-1 a air:BeliefRule;
44 air:label "sample -chaining example:age presence check";
45 air:pattern {
46 # if USE
47 :W s:triplePattern :T;
48 :T log:includes { [I example:age :V };
49 :W s:triplePattern :U;
50 :U log:includes { :V [] [] }.
51 };
52 air:description ("A restriction on the USE of example:age,
violated by " :T );
53 air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :sample-chaining }
54 # There are more policies, go to the next policy.
55 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-chaining-rule-2 ]
56
57 :sample-chaining-rule-2 a air:BeliefRule;
58 air:label "sample-chaining example:dob presence check";
59 air:pattern {
60 # if RETRIEVE, or alternately, not USE
61 :P s:var :V;
62 :W s:triplePattern :T;
63 :T log:includes { [] example:dob :V }
64 };
65 air:description ("A restriction on the RETRIEVE of example:dob,
violated by " :T );
66 air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :sample-chaining }
67 # There are more policies, go to the next policy.
68 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-chaining-rule-3 ]
69
70 :sample-chaining-rule-3 a air:BeliefRule;
71 air:label "sample-chaining example:ssn presence check";
72 air:pattern {
73 # if USE
74 :W s:triplePattern :T;
75 :T log:includes { [I example:ssn :V };
76 :W s:triplePattern :U;
77 :U log:includes { :V [] [1 }.
78 };
79 air:description ("A restriction on the USE of example:ssn,
violated by " :T );
80 air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :sample-chaining }
81 # Not done yet! There is at least one filter to check.
82 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-chaining-filter-0 ]
83
84 :sample-chaining-filter-0 a air:BeliefRule;
85 air:label "sample-chaining filter check";
86 air:pattern {
87 # Test for the filter.
88 :W s:triplePattern :T;
89 :T log:includes { [I example:age :V };
90 :V math:lessThan 1991.
91 };
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92 air:description ("A filter of the form (example:age math:
lessThan 1991), matched in " :T );
93 air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :sample-chaining }
94 # There are more filters, go to the next policy.
95 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-chaining-filter-1 ]
96
97 :sample-chaining-filter-1 a air:BeliefRule;
98 air:label "sample-chaining filter check";
99 air:pattern {
100 # Test for the filter.
101 :W s:triplePattern :T;
102 :T log:includes { [1 example:age :V };
103 :V math:greaterThan 18.
104 };
105 air:description ("A filter of the form (example:age math:
greaterThan 18), matched in " :T );
106 air:assert { :Q air:compliant-with :sample-chaining }
107 # No more filters, go to the default case.
108 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-chaining-default ]
109
110 :sample-chaining-default a air:BeliefRule;
111 air:label "sample-chaining default rule";
112 air:pattern { # Empty search.
113 };
114 air:description ("No restricted attributes found.");
115 air:assert { :Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-chaining }
116 #ends
B.11 Sample Default Deny Policy
1 # Auto-generated AIR default deny policy.
2
3 Oprefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>.
4 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
5 @prefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
6 @prefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>.
7 @prefix : <>.
8
9 # User-defined namespaces:
10 Oprefix example: <http://www.example.com/#>
11
12 @forAll :P, :Q, :T, :V.
13
14 :sample-defaultdeny a air:Policy;
15 air:label "A sample auto-generated default deny policy.";
16 air:rule :sample-defaultdeny-check.
17
18 :sample-defaultdeny-check a air:BeliefRule;
19 air:label "sample-defaultdeny query check";
20 air:pattern {
21 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
22 s:retrieve :P;
23 s:clause :W.
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24 ;
25 air:description ("Make sure this is a query.");
26 # Goes to the first rule. If there are no attributes,
27 # simply go to the default rule.
28 air:rule :sample-defaultdeny-noncompliance-rule.
29
30 :sample-defaultdeny-noncompliance-rule a air:BeliefRule;
31 air:label "sample-defaultdeny , a default deny policy.";
32 air:pattern {
33 :W s:triplePattern :T;
34 :T log:notIncludes { [] example:name [] };
35 :T log:notIncludes { [] example:age [1 };
36 :T log:notIncludes { [1 example:dob [] };
37 :T log:notIncludes { [] example:ssn [] };
38 ;
39 air:description ("This policy only enables access to example:
name example:age example:dob example:ssn . Found a triple
pattern that mentions another predicate: " :T );
40 air:assert{ :Q air:non-compliant-with :sample-defaultdeny }
41 # No more policies, go to the base case.
42 air:alt [ air:rule :sample-defaultdeny-default ]
43
44
45 :sample-defaultdeny-default a air:BeliefRule;
46 air:label "sample-defaultdeny default rule";
47 air:pattern { # Empty search.
48 ;
49 air:description ("We could not find any attributes that must be
included. Asserting compliance by default.");
50 air:assert{ :Q air:compliant-with :sample-defaultdeny }
51
52 #ends
B.12 No-Address Restriction Policy for Sample Sce-
nario
1 # Auto-generated AIR restriction policy.
2
3 @prefix air: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/TAMI/2007/amord/air#>.
4 @prefix log: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/log#>.
5 @prefix math: <http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/math#>.
6 Oprefix s: <http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2009/IARPA-PIR/sparql#>.
7 @prefix :<#>.
8
9 # User-defined namespaces:
10 @prefix ex: <http://example.com/#>.
11
12
13 oforAll :P, :Q, :T, :U, :V, :W.
14
15 :no-address a air:Policy;
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16 air:label "Users may not find the home address of members of the
database.";
17 air:rule :no-address-check.
18
19 :no-address-check a air:BeliefRule;
20 air:label "no-address query check";
21 air:pattern {
22 :Q a s:SPARQLQuery;
23 s:retrieve :P;
24 s:clause :W.
25 };
26 air:description ("Make sure this is a query.");
27 # Goes to the first rule. If there are no attributes,
28 # simply go to the default rule.
29 air:rule :no-address-rule-0.
30
31 :no-address-rule-0 a air:BeliefRule;
32 air:label "no-address ex:address restriction";
33 air:pattern {
34 # if RETRIEVE, or alternately, not USE
35 :P s:var :V.
36 :W s:triplePattern :T.
37 :T log:includes { [1 ex:address :V }. #2
38 };
39 air:description ("A restriction on the RETRIEVE of ex:address,
violated by " :T );
40 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :no-address};
41 # There are more policies, go to the next policy.
42 air:alt [ air:rule :no-address-rule-1 ]
43
44 :no-address-rule-1 a air:BeliefRule;
45 air:label "no-address ex:address restriction";
46 air:pattern {
47 # if USE
48 :W s:triplePattern :T.
49 :T log:includes { [1 ex:address :V }. #1
50 :W s:triplePattern :U.
51 :U log:includes { :V [] [] }.
52 };
53 air:description ("A restriction on the USE of ex:address,
violated by " :T );
54 air:assert{:Q air:non-compliant-with :no-address};
55 # No more policies, go to the base case.
56 air:alt [ air:rule :no-address-default ]
57
58 :no-address-default a air:BeliefRule;
59 air:label "no-address default rule";
60 air:pattern { # Empty search.
61 };
62 air:description ("No restricted attributes found.");
63 air:assert{ :Q air:compliant-with :no-address }.
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